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ETHICAL AND JUSTICE POLICY INQUIRY
BRIAN G. SELLERS* & BRUCE A. ARRIGO**
Based on the empirical evidence, automatic adolescent transfer to
adult criminal court poses significant processing, treatment, and recidivism
problems for youths, especially when issues of developmental maturity and
trial fitness are brought to the fore. These concerns notwithstanding, legal
tribunals increasingly rely on mandated waivers (both legislative and
prosecutorial) as a basis to further judicial decision-making whose aim is
punishment for serious juvenile offending and the protection of society from
such future criminality. This qualitative study examines the prevailing state
supreme court and appellate court opinions on this matter. By engaging in
textual analysis, both the jurisprudential intent that informs these opinions
and the ethical reasoning by which this intent is communicated are
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subjected to legal exegeses. Mindful of how existing strategies such as
commonsense justice, therapeutic jurisprudence, and restorative justice
represent types of psychological jurisprudence consistent with the
philosophy of virtue ethics, this Article tentatively and provisionally
delineates several policy recommendations for rethinking judicial decision-
making on the issue of automatic adolescent transfer.
I. INTRODUCTION
Various theoretical approaches underscore the education, training, and
research methods of the interdisciplinary law and psychology field. One
key method of inquiry is the law, psychology, and justice perspective.' This
method promotes social change and action through theory-sensitive
psychological jurisprudence.2  Psychological jurisprudence refers to
"theories that describe, explain, and predict law by reference to human
behavior."3  Thus, as a function of translating theory into public policy,
psychological jurisprudence tells judges and legislators how they should
make decisions, guided by sensible values and relevant data that draws
attention not merely to what law is, but to what law ought to be.
4
Within the domain of psychological jurisprudence, several dominant
principles and practices have emerged that attempt to grow the law-
psychology-justice agenda, especially in an effort to secure what is best for
offenders, victims, and the public more generally. Chief among these
principles and practices are (1) commonsense justice, (2) therapeutic
1 See Bruce A. Arrigo, Psychology and the Law: The Critical Agenda for Citizen Justice
and Radical Social Change, 20 JUST. Q. 399 (2003); Dennis R. Fox, Psychological
Jurisprudence and Radical Social Change, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 234 (1993). The other
two main approaches are the clinical perspective, emphasizing research and practice in
forensic psychology; and the law and social science orientation, stressing evidence-based
legal psychology. Bruce Arrigo & Dennis Fox, Psychology and the Law: The Crime of
Policy and the Search for Justice, in CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 159, 161-63
(Dennis Fox et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009). Admittedly, the three identified approaches are
somewhat overlapping; however, for the purpose of the ensuing investigation, the logic of
the law, psychology, and justice model will guide the analysis. This is because the other two
approaches do not fundamentally examine philosophical questions about the nature of justice
and ethics in relation to psycho-legal controversies. Arrigo, supra.
2 PSYCHOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE: CRITICAL EXPLORATIONS IN LAW, CRIME, AND
SOCIETY (Bruce A. Arrigo ed., 2004).
3 Mark A. Small, Advancing Psychological Jurisprudence, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 3, 11
(1993).
4 See, e.g., John Darley et al., Psychological Jurisprudence: Taking Psychology and Law
into the Twenty-First Century, in TAKING PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 35 (James R.P. Ogloff ed., 2002); Gary B. Melton, The Law Is a Good Thing




jurisprudence, and (3) restorative justice. Each of these notions is
summarily discussed below.
The notion of commonsense justice, as developed by Professor Finkel,
evolves from an understanding that while the law has specified an objective
path for society to follow in deciding guilt or innocence, this path does not
always take into account the ordinary citizen's notion of what is just and
fair.5 Thus, commonsense justice attempts to include community sentiment
(the judgment of the people at large) so that the law's more subjective
character can be honored.6  Incorporating the legal, moral, and
psychological reasoning adopted by everyday people enables the
displacement of the (misguided) direction that the law sets forth so that
more equitable decision-making can be pursued. This decision-making
endeavors to "perfect and complete the law."7
Therapeutic jurisprudence is "the use of social science to study the
extent to which a legal rule or practice promotes the psychological and
physical well-being of the people it affects."8 In other words, therapeutic
jurisprudence seeks to understand where and how the law can act as a
healing agent. 9 The aim of this practice is to address both civil disputes t°
and criminal concerns"1 in mental health law, wherein salubrious outcomes
are based on psychological values and insights.
12
5 NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE LAW (1995).
6 Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice, Psychology, and the Law: Prototypes that
Are Common, Senseful, and Not, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 461 (1997); Matthew T. Huss
et al., Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers: An Examination of Commonsense Notions,
Cognitions, and Judgments, 21 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 1063 (2006).
7 FINKEL, supra note 5, at 5. Finkel specifically links jury nullification to efforts that aim
to "perfect and complete the law" because it enables jurors to refuse the application of the
law in instances where the law is perceived unjust according to the reasoning of everyday
people.
8 William Schma et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Using the Law to Improve the
Public's Health, J.L. MED. & ETHICS, Winter 2005 Supp., at 59, 60.
9 See, e.g., JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
COURTS (Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler eds., 2003); LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds.,
1996).
10 James McGuire, Maintaining Change: Converging Legal and Psychological Initiatives
in a Therapeutic Jurisprudence Framework, 4 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 108 (2003); Michael
L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Mentally
Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
80(1995).
i Astrid Birgden, Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005 (Vic): A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Analysis, 14 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 78 (2007); Bill Glaser, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: An Ethical Paradigm for Therapists in Sex Offender Treatment Programs, 4
W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 143 (2003).
12 BRUCE J. WINICK, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH
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Restorative justice is a form of mediated reconciliation. 13 Its goal is to
repair the harm and suffering that follows in the wake of interpersonal,
organizational, or even global violence. This type of injury affects the
victim, the offender, and the community to which all opposing parties
belong. 14 Candid disclosures and humanistic dialogue guide the healing
process in which genuine, meaningful, and, ideally, transformative
resolutions are sought. 15
Interestingly, although not identified as such, these collective
principles and practices are consistent with virtue-based ethics. Articulated
most explicitly and systematically in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics,'
6
this version of moral philosophy seeks to promote a type of human
excellence that is rooted in reason whereby one's character is not
determined by what one does (for example, weighing competing interests;
endorsing rights, duties, and obligations) but, instead, is an expression of
living virtuously. 17 The highest purpose of this existence is to embody
eudaimonia (a flourishing or excellence in being), happiness, or a fulfilled
life. Aristotle's inquiry led him to explore those virtues that most
profoundly facilitate such human flourishing. These are habits of character
learned through practice; these are qualities that become a part of the person
through regularly exercising their use.18  Indeed, as Aristotle noted:
"Anything that we have to learn to do we learn by the actual doing of it:
people become builders by building and instrumentalists by playing
LAW (1997).
13 CRITICAL ISSUES IN RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (Howard Zehr & Barb Toews eds., 2004);
DANIEL W. VAN NESS & KAREN HEETDERKS STRONG, RESTORING JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION
TO RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (3d ed. 2006).
14 DENNIS SULLIVAN & LARRY TIFFT, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: HEALING THE FOUNDATIONS
OF OUR EVERYDAY LIVES (2d ed. 2005).
15 See, e.g., Gordon Bazemore & Rachel Boba, "Doing Good" to "Make Good":
Community Theory for Practice in a Restorative Justice Civic Engagement Reentry Model,
46 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION (2007); Donna Coker, Restorative Justice, Navajo
Peacemaking, and Domestic Violence, 10 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 67 (2006); Murray
Levine, The Family Group Conference in the New Zealand Children, Young Persons, and
Their Families Act of 1989 (CYP&F): Review and Evaluation, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 517
(2000); Mark S. Umbreit et al', Victims of Severe Violence in Mediated Dialogue with
Offender: The Impact of the First Multi-Site Study in the U.S., 13 INT'L REV. VICTIMOLOGY
27 (2006).
16 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Roger Crisp trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
17 CHRISTOPHER R. WILLIAMS & BRUCE A. ARRIGO, ETHICS, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 247-62 (2008).
18 Aristotle identified several virtues or traits of character that predisposed a person to act
morally. Additionally, he specified several vices or traits of character that inclined a person
to act immorally or harmfully. For a cataloguing of these habits, along with corresponding
discussion, see EMMETT BARCALOW, MORAL PHILOSOPHY: THEORIES AND ISSUES 106-19 (2d
ed. 1998); WILLIAMS & ARRIGO, supra note 17, at 248-51, 260-62.
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instruments. Similarly, we become just by performing just acts, temperate
by performing temperate ones, brave by performing brave ones."' 9
At the core of commonsense justice, therapeutic jurisprudence, and
restorative justice is the goal of growing the character of all parties
concerned, while simultaneously repairing the harm and reducing the non-
therapeutic effects that negatively affect those involved in a civil or
criminal dispute. Indeed, rather than emphasizing the infliction of
punishment for retributive ends, these three law and psychology notions
endorse, mostly unknowingly, though certainly implicitly, Aristotelian
moral philosophy. In short, they help to seed and encourage the
development of personal character and moral virtue among offenders,
victims, and the community to which both are intimately connected.
Commonsense justice accomplishes this by promoting the public's reasoned
participation in, and felt regard for, legal decision-making; therapeutic
jurisprudence does this by assessing where and how the rule of law can be
beneficial or harmful to citizens; and restorative justice achieves this by
fostering a culture of forgiveness and compassion among warring
individuals or groups. The collective effect of these three practices, then, is
the cultivation of an integrity-based society. This is a society in which the
moral fiber of individuals is more fully embraced and the flourishing
prospects for human justice are more completely realized.
One particular law and psychology topic where the logic of
psychological jurisprudence and the philosophy of virtue ethics are most
germane is the competency-to-stand-trial doctrine. According to some
investigators, the issue of trial fitness is "the most significant mental health
inquiry pursued in the system of criminal law. 2 ° More specifically, on the
issue of juvenile competency to stand trial, the matter is even more
complicated given the presence of developmental maturity factors. Indeed,
"[d]espite the fact that attorneys and judges need guidance to recognize and
address these issues in dealing with young defendants, the relationship
between immaturity and competence to stand trial has been largely ignored
in research and policy circles., 2 1 The historical understanding of juvenile
fitness for trial neglects to take into account the psychological limitations
19 ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 91-92 (J.A.K.
Thomson trans., Penguin Books rev. ed. 1976) (1953).
20 Richard E. Redding & Lynda E. Frost, Adjudicative Competence in the Modern
Juvenile Court, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 353, 353 (2001); see also MARK C. BARDWELL &
BRUCE A. ARRIGO, CRIMINAL COMPETENCY ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF COLIN FERGUSON 3
(2002).
21 Laurence Steinberg, Juveniles on Trial: MacArthur Foundation Study Calls
Competency into Question, 18 CRIM. JUST., Fall 2003, at 20, 21.
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that such youthfulness naturally entails.22 Indeed, many juveniles possess
similar deficits as those who experience mental illness or mental
retardation. However, those deficits affecting adolescent competency are
not because of mental illness or mental retardation; rather, they are because
of cognitive or emotional immaturity.2 3
In recent years, given the increase in violent juvenile crime, a more
punitive response by the criminal justice system has followed.2 4  For
example, in terms of court adjudication, automatic forms of juvenile
transfer to adult court have steadily increased given the current "get tough"
policy rationale used to address serious adolescent offending.2  Not
surprisingly, however, the decision to rely on automatic waiver strategies
has led to a number of processing, confinement, and recidivism concerns.
Along these lines, investigators have empirically shown how developmental
immaturity negatively affects a waived juvenile's ability to be fit for trial in
the adult system.26 Notwithstanding these findings, both the courts and
state legislatures have mostly elected to ignore the adverse impact that
current transfer policies have on juvenile offenders and on society more
generally. While researchers have outlined the need to properly assess
transferred youths for trial fitness purposes-with special consideration
22 See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Competence, Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of
Atkinsfor Executing and Sentencing Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 463 (2003); Thomas
Grisso, Adolescents' Decision Making: A Developmental Perspective on Constitutional
Provisions in Delinquency Cases, 32 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 3 (2006);
Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents'
and Adults' Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (2003).
23 THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND
INSTRUMENTS 73-74 (2d ed. 2003).
24 THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE
CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000); AARON KUPCHIK,
JUDGING JUVENILES: PROSECUTING ADOLESCENTS IN ADULT AND JUVENILE COURTS (2006);
YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE (Thomas Grisso &
Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000); Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Transfer, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL'Y 599 (2004); Barry C. Feld, Race, Youth Violence, and the Changing Jurisprudence of
Waiver, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 3 (2001) [hereinafter Feld, Changing Jurisprudence of Waiver].
25 Feld, Juvenile Transfer, supra note 24, at 599; Megan C. Kurlychek & Brian D.
Johnson, The Juvenile Penalty: A Comparison of Juvenile and Young Adult Sentencing
Outcomes in Criminal Court, 4 CRIMINOLOGY 485, 485 (2004); Benjamin Steiner et al.,
Legislative Waiver Reconsidered: General Deterrent Effects of Statutory Exclusion Laws
Enacted Post-1979, 23 JUST. Q. 34, 35 (2006).
26 Steven Bell, Tate v. State: Highlighting the Need for a Mandatory Competency
Hearing, 28 NOVA L. REV. 575 (2004); Grisso et al., supra note 22; Elizabeth S. Scott &
Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83
N.C. L. REV. 793 (2005); Steinberg, supra note 21; Jodie L. Viljoen & Thomas Grisso,
Prospects for Remediating Juveniles' Adjudicative Incompetence, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 87 (2007).
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given to developmental factors-the legal community regrettably has not
endorsed these recommendations. Interestingly, no study has yet
undertaken an exploration of the ethical reasoning that informs legal
decision-making with respect to automatic juvenile transfer practices where
issues of developmental maturity and adjudicative competence figure
prominently into the analysis. Stated differently, the logic of psychological
jurisprudence and the philosophy of ethics communicated through the
relevant court cases on the law and psychology subject of adolescent
automatic waiver have not been systematically examined. A thoughtful
inquiry into both may very well be the basis for translating (assumed)
theory into worthwhile public policy.
Accordingly, the present inquiry focuses on these prescient matters.
The moral philosophy embedded within those court cases that reflect the
prevailing judicial perspective on automatic juvenile transfer,
developmental maturity, and trial fitness will be made explicit. After so
doing, it will then be possible to assess whether, and to what extent, current
retributive policies toward serious juvenile offenders promote--or fail to
promote-excellence in character for all stakeholders in which the value of
living virtuously guides the jurisprudential reasoning.
In Part II, the relevant literature on adolescent waiver, the social and
behavioral science community's assessment of it, and the established
approaches to ethics are presented. The juvenile transfer commentary
explains current practices in court processing and the corresponding
problems. The empirical research examines adolescent waiver, especially
when complicated by developmental maturity and competency to stand trial
issues. The moral philosophy exposition outlines the key principles that
inform each school of ethical thought. In Part III, the qualitative
methodology utilized for this study is described. This includes a discussion
of how the specific court cases that constitute the data set were selected, as
well as an accounting of the two levels of textual exegeses that were applied
to these legal decisions. In Part IV, the results are delineated. Of particular
interest are the types of ethical reasoning conveyed through the
jurisprudential reasoning of each court case and across all of the decisions.
In Part V, several implications that emerge from the findings are reviewed.
Mindful of commonsense justice, therapeutic jurisprudence, and restorative
justice, a number of policy recommendations are provisionally specified.
Ultimately, this portion of the study considers whether the moral
philosophy informing automatic juvenile transfer practices as supported by
the court system is flawed, misguided, or inadequate, particularly given
recent strategies in the law and psychology field that advance virtue-based
resolutions to crime and delinquency.
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I1. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. TYPES OF JUVENILE WAIVER: AN OVERVIEW
Approximately 200,000 adolescents under the age of eighteen in the
United States are tried as adults each year, and roughly 12% of these
27transferred juveniles are under the age of sixteen. The legal basis for
adjudicating youths to the adult system is the waiver process. Three waiver
forms exist.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the most common transfer strategy
was judicial waiver.28 In this approach, the juvenile court judge uses his or
her discretion and determines whether transfer to a criminal court is
warranted based on a hearing. At the hearing, the judge reviews the
evidence regarding the youth's amenability to treatment and potential threat
to society. 29 Typically, a decision to transfer hinges on the seriousness of
the offense and the extent and type of the offender's prior record.
The second waiver strategy is known as legislative offense exclusion
or statutory waiver. 30  This approach is the easiest way for the state
legislature to emphasize the seriousness of the crime and to promote a
retributive agenda. Legislatures create juvenile courts, and, as such, they
are responsible for defining the appropriate jurisdictional venue in which a
case can be considered. Moreover, they can support transfer based on the
seriousness of the offense and the youth's age. For example, a state may
exclude from juvenile court jurisdiction any youth sixteen years of age or
older who is charged with a serious offense such as murder.31
The third strategy is prosecutorial waiver, or "direct file. ' 32 In this
approach, concurrent jurisdiction grants the prosecutor discretion to choose
whether a youth can be charged in a juvenile or criminal court, without
27 Steinberg, supra note 21, at 2 1.
28 Feld, Juvenile Transfer, supra note 24, at 600.
29 Id.; Norman Poythress et al., The Competence-Related Abilities of Adolescent
Defendants in Criminal Court, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75 (2006); Martha June Rossiter,
Transferring Children to Adult Criminal Court: How to Best Protect Our Children and
Society, 27 J. Juv. L. 123 (2006).
30 KUPCHIK, supra note 24, at 16; David 0. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence,
and Juvenile Transfer: How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1555
(2004); Feld, Changing Jurisprudence of Waiver, supra note 24, at 3; Rossiter, supra note
29, at 126.
31 Feld, Juvenile Transfer, supra note 24, at 600 ("Legislative offense exclusion laws
excise from juvenile court jurisdiction older youths whom prosecutors charge with serious
offenses and 'automatically' place them in criminal court."); Feld, Changing Jurisprudence
of Waiver, supra note 24, at 17.
32 KUPCHIK, supra note 24; Brink, supra note 30; Feld, Juvenile Transfer, supra note 24;
Poythress et al., supra note 29.
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having to justify the decision through a judicial hearing or a formal record.33
Current trends suggest that both statutory and prosecutorial waivers are the
primary forms of juvenile transfer,34 while judicial waiver is utilized less
frequently.35 Automatic waivers could, for example, alter the focus of a
state's juvenile court to fit "get tough" policies demanded by the public in
which a maximum age limit (for instance, fourteen) could guarantee that
youths who exceed this restriction were automatically waived to the adult
system.36
The various ways by which a juvenile can be transferred to criminal
court enable judges, prosecutors, and legislatures to have considerable
discretion in exercising their respective waiver decisions. Interestingly,
judicial waiver allows for a hearing in which the juvenile's maturity level,
amenability to treatment, and danger to society are all evaluated.37
However, non-judicial forms of transfer, specifically statutory and
prosecutorial waivers, do not adequately assess psychological maturity and
amenability to rehabilitation. 3s A mandatory waiver only requires that the
juvenile court find sufficient probable cause suggesting that the youth
committed the crime according to the guidelines of the waiver statute.39
Additionally, in 2003, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported findings
from data collected in forty different jurisdictions on transferred juveniles
during 1998. The data revealed that 41.6% of the adolescents were
transferred by statutory exclusion, 34.7% were transferred by prosecutorial
direct file, and only 23.7% were transferred by judicial waiver.4° Consistent
with these figures, new statutory waiver laws enacted in 1994 increased the
number of juveniles automatically transferred to criminal court by 73% as
33 KUPCHIK, supra note 24; Brink, supra note 30; Feld, Juvenile Transfer, supra note 24,
at 600.
34 KUPCHIK, supra note 24, at 155; GERARD A. RAINVILLE & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE FELONY DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL COURTS (2003); Brink, supra
note 30; Grisso, supra note 22.
35 Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 231; Feld, Juvenile Transfer, supra note 24;
Feld, Changing Jurisprudence of Waiver, supra note 24; Poythress et al., supra note 29, at
77.
36 Brink, supra note 30; Feld, Juvenile Transfer, supra note 24; Feld, Changing
Jurisprudence of Waiver, supra note 24.
37 MICHAEL A. CORRIERO, JUDGING CHILDREN AS CHILDREN: A PROPOSAL FOR A JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM 40 (2006).
38 Feld, Juvenile Transfer, supra note 24; Lois B. Oberlander et al., Preadolescent
Adjudicative Competence: Methodological Considerations and Recommendations for
Practice Standards, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 545 (2001); Rossiter, supra note 29.
39 Rossiter, supra note 29.
40 RAINVILLE & SMITH, supra note 34.
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compared with the waiver rate in 1986.41 Collectively, these statistics
suggest a departure from judicial waiver in favor of automatic forms of
transfer whose purpose is to streamline the process of adjudicating youthful
offenders. Statutory exclusion laws expose juveniles to adult criminal
proceedings and sanctions without assessing for characteristics such as
psychological maturity, social history, or prior record.42 Moreover, these
laws ensure that adjudication will be based on the offense rather than on the
offender, that the severity of penalties will increase, and that judicial
discretion will greatly diminish.43  No formal guidelines govern
prosecutorial discretion in direct-file waivers, and inadequate access to
proper personal and clinical records about youthful offenders may
inaccurately lead to false determinations concerning the most dangerous
juveniles.44  In addition, the lack of formal guidelines means that
prosecutorial discretion is based more on subjective factors, such as where
the youth resides and the severity of the offense, rather than more objective
measures, such as assessing for maturity level, amenability to treatment,
and level of risk or threat.45
A primary policy rationale for relying on the newer forms of automatic
waiver is the deterrence of future juvenile crime.46 Regrettably, evidence-
based research has yet to support this rationale.47 For example, employing a
quasi-experimental, multiple-interrupted-times-series design, investigators
concluded that statutory exclusion laws in twenty-two states had no
statistically significant effect on general deterrence. 48  Another study,
utilizing the same research design and published in this Journal, examined
fourteen states with direct-file statutes; investigators found that direct-file
laws had no lasting deterrent effect on juvenile crime.49
41 Dana Royce Baerger et al., Competency to Stand Trial in Preadjudicated and
Petitioned Juvenile Defendants, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 314 (2003); David R.
Katner, The Mental Health Paradigm and the MacArthur Study: Emerging Issues
Challenging the Competence of Juveniles in Delinquency Systems, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 503
(2006).
42 Robert 0. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in Theory and Practice, in CHANGING BORDERS OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 45, 48; Feld, Juvenile Transfer, supra note 24, at 601;
Oberlander et al., supra note 38; Rossiter, supra note 29.
43 CORRIERO, supra note 37, at 130; Franklin E. Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of
Waiver, in CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 207, 214.
44 Feld, Juvenile Transfer, supra note 24, at 601.
41 Id. at 601-02.
46 Bishop & Frazier, supra note 35, at 245-48; Feld, Juvenile Transfer, supra note 24, at
602; Rossiter, supra note 29.
4' KUPCHIK, supra note 24, at 151.
48 Steiner et al., supra note 25, at 38-40.
49 Benjamin Steiner & Emily Wright, Assessing the Relative Effects of State Direct File
Waiver Laws on Violent Juvenile Crime: Deterrence or Irrelevance?, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
[Vol. 99
ADOLESCENT TRANSFER
Further, New York statistics indicate that more than 60% of transferred
youth recidivate within thirty-six months.50 Conversely, a study of 800
adolescent offenders charged with robbery found that those adjudicated in
juvenile court recidivated roughly 20% less than those waived to the adult
system.51  A Pennsylvania study revealed that juveniles transferred to
criminal court received harsher punishments for similar crimes than young
adults (eighteen to twenty-four years-old) deemed ineligible for juvenile
court. 52 As investigators noted, transferred adolescents received eighteen
months incarceration on average, while their young adult counterparts were
confined for an average of only six months.53 Thus, youthfulness or young
age is used as an aggravating, rather than a mitigating, factor for
transferring juveniles5 4 despite the absence of empirical evidence
supporting juvenile transfer based on the deterrence-of-future-crime
justification. Complicating this disturbing trend are studies that report the
rate of adult incarceration for transferred adolescents. To illustrate, the
Bureau of Justice Statistics reported in 2003 that 64% of juveniles
convicted in criminal court during 1998 were sentenced to incarceration,
with 43% percent of that total serving terms in adult prisons and the
remainder sentenced to confinement in jail settings.55
B. THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
The extant research on juvenile waiver-including types of transfer,
policy justifications for such a practice, and recidivism trends that follow-
have led to several social and behavioral science questions about the
appropriateness of exposing an adolescent to the criminal trial. In
particular, investigators have examined six questions: (1) Are automatic
waivers punitive in nature, and do the courts adequately assess
developmental maturity factors when considering competence to stand trial;
(2) Can the psychosocial aspects of developmental maturity be specified
and, if so, what are they; (3) Is developmental immaturity a sufficient factor
to declare a waived juvenile incompetent to stand trial; (4) How does one
accurately measure the multiple dimensions of maturity; (5) What have
researchers proposed to ensure the inclusion of developmental maturity
CRIMINOLOGY 1451 (2006).
50 CORRIERO, supra note 37, at 47.
51 Richard E. Redding & James C. Howell, Blended Sentencing in American Juvenile
Courts, in CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 145.
52 Kurlychek & Johnson, supra note 25.
" Id. at 498.
54 MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN
PENAL CULTURE 150-56 (2004), cited in Feld, supra note 22, at 602.
55 RAINVILLE & SMITH, supra note 34, at 5-6.
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factors in competency evaluations for purposes of courtroom decision-
making; and (6) Why is it important to assess developmental maturity in
cases where juveniles are waived to the adult system? Each concern is
summarily discussed below.
Some researchers note that the principal focus of waivers based on
prosecutorial discretion and automatic transfer emphasizes the crime
committed to the near exclusion of the juvenile who transgresses.56 As
investigators warn, this orientation makes issues such as public safety,
retribution, and deterrence so compelling that the courts and legislatures are
less inclined to preserve the legal distinctions between adolescents and their
adult counterparts.57  Critics maintain that the danger with this
"conventional belief' is its assumption that once a juvenile is designated for
automatic transfer to criminal proceedings, the judgment regarding adult
sanctions is also reached.58 As a practical matter, what this means is that
the youth faces imminent punishment as an adult without consideration for
possible developmental immaturity or related deficits. Further,
investigators argue that ignoring the importance of developmental
immaturity and offender age in waiver determinations is akin to "ignor[ing]
an elephant that has wandered into the courtroom., 59  Indeed, as the
empirical evidence indicates, deficiencies in "psychosocial maturity"
among juveniles are caused by their impulsivity,60 reliance on peer
acceptance, 61 lack of autonomy, 62 and poor judgment in relation to future
consequences.63 Given these findings, researchers conclude that youthful
offenders must be evaluated for trial fitness before a transfer decision can
be made.64
56 See Feld, Juvenile Transfer, supra note 24, at 602; Steiner & Wright, supra note 49;
Zimring, supra note 43.
57 See KuPCHIK, supra note 24, at 18-19; Brink, supra note 30; Feld, Changing
Jurisprudence of Waiver, supra note 24, at 12-14; Kurlychek & Johnson, supra note 25;
Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, A Developmental Perspective on Jurisdictional
Boundary, in CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 379, 379-80;
Steiner & Wright, supra note 49; Steiner et al., supra note 25.
58 CORRIERO, supra note 37, at 170.
59 Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 57, at 381.
60 Grisso, supra note 22; Grisso et al., supra note 22; Oberlander et al., supra note 38;
Scott & Grisso, supra note 26, at 813.
61 KUPCHIK, supra note 24, at 19; Feld, supra note 22; Katner, supra note 41; Redding &
Frost, supra note 20; Elizabeth S. Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons
from Developmental Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 24, at 291, 304; Scott &
Grisso, supra note 26, at 815.
62 Katner, supra note 41.
63 Id.; see also Grisso, supra note 22, at 8-9; Oberlander et al., supra note 38; Redding &
Frost, supra note 20; Scott & Grisso, supra note 26, at 815-16.
64 Patricia Allard & Malcolm C. Young, Prosecuting Juveniles in Adult Court: The
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As previously mentioned, psychosocial factors affecting a youth's
reasoning process and ability to adequately function cognitively during the
trial are numerous, varied, and profound.65  For example, with respect to
peer influence, impaired adolescents are not fully capable of understanding
the long-term consequences of their actions, engage in decision-making that
typically reflects an absence of independent reasoning, and are highly
66inclined to pursue risk-taking behaviors symptomatic of their impulsivity.
Moreover, with respect to autonomy, Corriero asserted that the diminished
criminal responsibility of wayward juveniles is "explained in part by the
prevailing circumstances [in which they] have less control, or less
experience with control, over their own environment., 67  Certainly, as
researchers endeavor to more clearly define and operationalize
developmental maturity factors, their potential use in a legal context-
especially for furthering the construct of competence to stand trial-will
likely increase as well.68  However, to date no official premise exists in
which developmental immaturity represents a basis to declare a juvenile
incompetent for adjudicative purposes. 69 The lack of such a premise is
linked to the significance courts and state legislatures avail to the notion of
maturity.
Indeed, one of the more common concerns regarding competency to
stand trial among transferred youth is whether developmental immaturity is
a sufficient factor when making determinations about a juvenile defendant's
mental fitness for trial.70 Most courts require that the defendant be
diagnosed as suffering from some form of psychiatric illness or mental
retardation as a prerequisite for an incompetency determination. 7' Research
Practitioner's Perspective, 2 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAc. 65, 75 (2002); Bell, supra note 26;
Grisso et al., supra note 22; Redding & Frost, supra note 20; Scott & Grisso, supra note 26;
Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 57, at 397, 404.
65 See Grisso et al., supra note 22; Scott, supra note 61; Scott & Grisso, supra note 26.
66 Grisso, supra note 22, at 7-9; Grisso et al., supra note 22.
67 CORRIERO, supra note 37, at 175 (citing Laurence D. Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott,
Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished
Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)
("[A]s legal minors, [juveniles] lack the freedom that adults have to extricate themselves
from a criminogenic setting.")).
68 Grisso et al., supra note 22, at 335.
69 Richard Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful Offenders,
in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 24, at 88.
70 Grisso, supra note 22; Grisso et al., supra note 22, at 335-36; Katner, supra note 41;
Redding & Frost, supra note 20; Scott & Grisso, supra note 26.
71 Baerger et al., supra note 41, at 31; Mark C. Bardwell & Bruce A. Arrigo, Competency
to Stand Trial: A Law, Psychology, and Policy Assessment, 30 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 147, 163
(2002); Oberlander et al., supra note 38, at 548; Scott & Grisso, supra note 26; Viljoen &
Grisso, supra note 26.
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indicates that roughly one-third of juveniles between eleven and thirteen
years of age, and one-fifth of juveniles between fourteen and fifteen years
of age, lack the requisite competence to stand trial.72 Importantly, the
findings reveal that adolescent immaturity affects the juvenile defendant's
behavior and ability to make decisions regarding future orientation and risk
perception during the legal proceedings.73 When judgment is impaired or
when maturity stemming from sufficient psychosocial development is
absent, then the youth's ability to competently function in adult criminal
proceedings is compromised.
In contrast to previous research, a Florida study recently found that a
sample of 118 direct-filed male youths between the ages of sixteen and
seventeen had few differences in competence-related abilities when
compared to a sample of 165 incarcerated adults between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-four.74 The investigators noted that while their
findings supported direct-file policies for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old
juveniles whose immaturity did not impair their competence-related
abilities, future research would do well to assess whether the results were
peculiar to the sample and jurisdiction.75 Moreover, and consistent with the
thrust of the ensuing inquiry, the findings did not include a discussion of the
jurisprudential basis upon which juveniles were direct-filed by prosecutorial
discretion. Thus, the underlying ethical considerations operating here in
support of waiver were not subjected to careful scrutiny or systematic
analysis.
Although researchers have found that developmental immaturity is a
potentially significant factor affecting the adjudicative competence of
juveniles, they have yet to determine how best to measure it. One study
investigated the specific abilities that psychologists considered pertinent
when assessing maturity in juvenile defendants for purposes of adjudicative
competence.76 The majority of psychologists focused on cognitive or social
skills; only a few clinicians expressed concerns for psycho-legal abilities,
that is, how a defendant's level of maturity affects his or her functioning in
a legal proceeding.77 Findings such as these suggest that forensic
psychologists lack adequate guidelines to properly assess maturity factors,
especially given the variety of testing instruments used to evaluate
72 Steinberg, supra note 21, at 23-24.
73 Id. at 24; Katner, supra note 41; Scott & Grisso, supra note 26, at 815, 823.
74 Poythress et al., supra note 29, at 88-90.
75 Id.
76 Nancy L. Ryba et al., Assessment of Maturity in Juvenile Competency to Stand Trial
Evaluations: A Survey of Practitioners, 3 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAc. 23 (2003).
77 Id. at 40-41.
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78(juvenile) competency. Thus, as some experts have concluded, the
"judgment-related" factors associated with developmental immaturity are
not consistent with adult competency evaluations; as such, it is a difficult
task for psychologists, attorneys, and courts to take these factors into
consideration.79
Bonnie proposed a reformulation of the concept of competency. 80 As a
multi-faceted construct, it would include the following: (1) the ability to
assist counsel, (2) the ability to reason and understand the legal proceedings
and charges against the accused, and (3) the ability to make legal
81decisions. In this reformulation, adjudicative competence requires
"maturity of judgment." 82  Psychosocial factors greatly influence an
adolescent's level of maturity and ability to make sound, autonomous
judgments.8 3 However, psychosocial immaturity is not clearly defined by
the Dusky v. United States standard of adjudicative competency.' 4 This
case represents the legal criterion most often applied to transferred juveniles
facing criminal sanctions.85 Grisso and his co-authors addressed the
challenges the courts might confront if developmental immaturity were
identified as a sufficient basis to find adolescents incompetent to stand trial
in criminal court. These investigators proposed a "two-tier standard" for
adjudicative competency. 86 They argued that juveniles found incompetent
to stand trial in adult adversarial proceedings because of developmental
immaturity might still face adjudication in delinquency proceedings, which
is consistent with a new "relaxed competence standard., 8 7 However, some
commentators suggest that the two-tier competency standard represents a
hopeful remedy developed by researchers who fear that the courts and
legislatures will not address developmental immaturity as a basis for
incompetence unless these decision brokers can be assured that juvenile
offenders will not be immune from sanctions precisely because of their
78 Id. at 27; see also Thomas Grisso, Forensic Clinical Evaluations Related to Waiver of
Jurisdiction, in CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 330.
79 Eileen P. Ryan & Daniel C. Murrie, Competence to Stand Trial and Young Children:
Is the Presumption of Competence Valid?, 5 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 89, 92 (2005)
(citing Redding & Frost, supra note 20, at 378).
8o Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical
Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 291 (1992).
81 Id. at 297.
82 Id.; see also Grisso et al., supra note 22, at 335.
83 Grisso et al., supra note 22.
84 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
85 See Grisso et al., supra note 22, at 334; Scott & Grisso, supra note 26, at 799-800.
86 Grisso et al., supra note 22, at 360.
87 Id.
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"developmental incompetence.,"8 8 This concern is well founded, especially
since maturity cannot be easily restored 89
The significance of the incompetency doctrine, as supported by rights
protected under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, guarantees the credibility of the criminal proceedings while
upholding the "'accuracy, fairness, and dignity of the process."' 90  The
integrity of the adversarial system requires that courts not adjudicate
incompetent defendants; thus, understanding how developmental maturity
affects competency to stand trial for transferred juveniles is extremely
important.
Grisso identified four areas pertinent to the developmental concerns
regarding trial competence for juveniles.91  These areas include: (1)
adolescents' understanding of the legal system, (2) their belief that legal
circumstances applied to them, (3) their capacity for communicating with
counsel, and (4) the processes underlying their decision-making. 92
Oberlander and her co-authors outlined various developmental factors that
might enhance trial competency deficits.93 These factors consisted of motor
behavior, emotional functioning, attention span, language development and
expressive communication, frame of reference and capacity for role
differentiation and group relating, and passage of time.94  As the
investigators observed, improper development in these areas of maturity
might adversely affect a juvenile's capacity to function sufficiently and
rationally under the Dusky standard of trial competence.95 Moreover, the
lack of proper developmental maturity might compel a fact-finder to
conclude that a youth with such deficits was too immature to cope with the
dynamics of the adversarial system. 96  Thus, following Grisso's 2000
88 Id.; see also Scott & Grisso, supra note 26.
89 Viljoen & Grisso, supra note 26, at 92-93. There is reason for concern among state
legislatures if juvenile offenders are found incompetent due to immaturity alone. Maturity
can only be restored through age and experience; therefore, the courts could not hold such
juvenile offenders indefinitely because it is unconstitutional. See Grisso et al., supra note
22, at 360-61 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (explaining that the state must
release an incompetent defendant if competence cannot be restored within a reasonable
amount of time)).
90 Bardwell & Arrigo, supra note 71, at 154 (citations omitted); see also Scott & Grisso,
supra note 26, at 799-800.
91 Grisso, supra note 78; Grisso et al., supra note 22.
92 Id.; see also Kirk Heilbrun et al., Juvenile Competence to Stand Trial: Research Issues
in Practice, 20 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 573 (1996),
93 Oberlander et al., supra note 38.
94 Id. at 557-60.
95 Id.
96 Id.; see also Grisso et al., supra note 22, at 357; Scott & Grisso, supra note 26.
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findings, 97 "psychosocial immaturity" appears to restrict an adolescent
defendant's abilities to understand the four legal areas of trial competence
because the youth might not possess the decisional competence necessary
for sound "legal decision-making" in regard to the long-term consequences
of his or her legal judgments (for example, plea bargaining, confessing
guilt, and so on).98 Given this analysis and mindful of the Dusky standard,
some researchers have concluded that "it should make no difference
whether the source of the defendant's incompetency is mental illness or
immaturity." 99 Currently there appear to be no investigations that inquire
about the ethical basis for which automatic juvenile transfer practices are
increasingly preferred. Thus, the present analyses, within this Article,
attempts to fill this void within the existing literature.
C. APPROACHES TO ETHICS
Three basic approaches to ethics are discernible in the literature.
These include consequentialism, formalism, and virtue-based reasoning. In
what follows, the principles embodied by these moral philosophies are
summarily reviewed. Additionally, applications in relevant criminal justice
contexts are briefly discussed, particularly where useful to and appropriate
for the thrust of this overall study.
Following a more strict interpretation of the doctrine, consequentialism
asserts that individuals should act in their best interest to ensure optimal
effects (that is, gains) as a result of those actions. 00 However, three forms
of consequentialism exist, and each offers a somewhat modified assessment
of this fundamental position. The forms of consequentialism are ethical
egoism, contractualism, and utilitarianism.
Ethical egoism claims that people are intrinsically motivated by self-
interest, and pursue actions and seek outcomes that will benefit themselves
over others.l0 l Consistent with this view, Thomas Hobbes, a psychological
and ethical egoist, wrote in Leviathan that:
[E]very man is Enemy to every man... wherein men live without other security,
than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish ... there is no
place for Industry... no Culture of the Earth... no Navigation... no
Knowledge... no account of Time ... no Arts ... no Letters... no Society; and
97 Grisso, supra note 78.
98 Grisso et al., supra note 22, at 357.
99 Id. at 358, 361.
100 MICHAEL SLOTE, COMMON-SENSE MORALITY AND CONSEQUENTIALISM 12 (1985).
101 WILLIAMS & ARRIGO, supra note 17, at 184.
2009]
BRIAN G. SELLERS & BRUCE A. ARRIGO
which is worst of all, continual feare, and danger of violent death; and the life of man,
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.
10 2
Hobbes's view of the state of nature, or what humankind would be like
without formal government, suggests that individuals in pursuit of their own
self-interest create an environment of competitiveness, fear, and insecurity.
Hampton appropriated the Hobbesian perspective on self-interest and, by
extension, ethical egoism, to explain possible motivations for one's
opposition to the law. 10 3  Specifically, she noted that identifying moral
agendas in the furtherance of personal desires helps account for how the law
is egoistically displaced.
10 4
Contractualism maintains that the establishment of government and its
subsequent laws through the notion of a "social pact" allows for
cooperation among individuals and freedom from fear otherwise present in
the state of nature.10 5 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, one of the principal architects
of this version of consequentialism, noted that "[elach of us puts . . . all
[our] power in common under the supreme direction of the general will,
and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible
part of the whole."' 1 6 Thus, contractualism seeks to create the civil state
where moral rules and regulations govern people's actions so all may
coexist, share in the security the state provides, and engage in unselfishness.
Utilitarianism is a unique form of consequentialism in that it is
altruistic and fosters the "Principle of Utility." This principle maintains that
when faced with a moral situation, one must choose the action that has the
best overall outcome for all involved. 0 7  In other words, utilitarianism
entails seeking "the greatest amount of happiness altogether" in accordance
with the "greatest happiness principle."' 1 8 Thus, ethical reasoning, choice,
and behavior require that one deliberate over the consequences of one's
actions to ensure the greatest good for the greatest number of people.
However, in undertaking such an analysis, the individual must be careful to
discern whether the ends secured justify the means employed. This is
102 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Richard Tuck ed., rev. student ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996) (1651); see also WILLIAMS & ARRIGO, supra note 17, at 191.
103 Jean Hampton, Mens Rea, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS 50, 70 (Paul Leighton &
Jeffrey Reiman eds., 2001).
14 Id. at 70-71.
105 WILLIAMS & ARRIGO, supra note 17, at 193.
106 JAMES P. STERBA, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: CLASSICAL WESTERN TEXTS IN
FEMINIST AND MULTICULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 240 (3d ed. 2003) (emphasis omitted).
107 JEREMY BENTHAM & JOHN STUART MILL, THE UTILITARIANS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1973); WILLIAMS & ARRIGO, supra note 17,
at 197.




because utilitarian arguments can (and sometimes do) result in the rights of
the minority being violated in pursuit of the greater good (that of the
majority).10 9  Interestingly, Steinberg and Schwartz suggested that
researchers should examine the utilitarian perspective with respect to
juvenile transfer policies. 10 As they noted, one could "raise questions
about fairness and justice and probe whether treating juvenile crime in a
particular way strikes an acceptable balance between the rights of the
offender, the interests of the offended, and the concerns of the
community."1
Formalism is another school of ethical thought. It is often termed
deontology or Kantian ethics. Deontology is the practice of behaving out of
moral duty because it is deemed "right" rather than because one fears
potential or adverse consequences. 1 2 In support of this notion, Immanuel
Kant identified what he termed the "categorical imperative.' '1 l3  These
imperatives constitute actions that are good, morally justified, and demand
obligatory adherence regardless of personal or unique circumstances.
However, as Ross argued, an individual can confront a moral dilemma
when having to choose between two categorical imperatives."14 In response
to this dilemma, Ross presented the concept of prima facie
responsibilities."l 5 These are "conditional duties" that may be superseded
by other obligations because they possess higher moral importance.'
1 6
Above all, Kant deemed human dignity to have the highest moral
significance; thus, he argued that people should never be used "as a means
to some end." ' 1 7 Kant also argued that a maxim, or moral rule, should be
viewed as a universal law."l8 Consequently, people should abide by such a
rule at all times. However, if the maxim did not attain the status of a
universal law, it should be rejected altogether.' 19
109 WILLIAMS & ARRIGO, supra note 17, at 207.
110 Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes to
Court, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 24, at 9, 28-29.
I"' Id. at 28-29.
112 JAY S. ALBANESE, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: BEING ETHICAL WHEN
No ONE Is LOOKING 27 (2006); IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS (Thomas E. Hill, Jr., & Arnulf Zweig eds., student ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2002)
(1785).
"3 KANT, supra note 112, at 216.
114 W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 18-19 (1930).
115 id.
116 Id. at 19-21.
117 WILLIAMS & ARRIGO, supra note 17, at 224, 239.
"' See id. at 219.
119 Id.; see KANT, supra note 112, at 204.
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Virtue ethics, or Nichomachean philosophy, is Aristotle's teleological
perspective regarding human purpose and existence. 2° Virtue ethics
suggests that human beings can flourish and excel. In order to do so, they
must actualize their potential moral reasoning by expressing moral
character through the decisions they make and the actions they undertake.' 2 1
According to Aristotle, the highest good that all people seek is a flourishing
in being. 122  This state of existence is consistent with happiness
(eudaimonia), and is achieved through developing one's moral virtues.
123
Aristotle noted that people have the ability to engage in higher reasoning. 
l 4
He also recognized that we are social beings and that, as such, we can only
thrive as moral agents if we cooperate with others and develop lasting
relationships that will foster a sense of connectedness. 125  Excellence in
character, along with virtue, must be learned through experience. 126 When
we live virtuously as a function of our humanity-and not because of duties
or because of consequences-we have the greatest likelihood of obtaining
genuine happiness. Building on this notion, Aristotle observed that virtue
"is a mean between two vices, one of excess, the other of deficiency."
'
121
For example, courage is the "golden mean" or virtue between the excess
vice of foolishness and the deficient vice of cowardice. 128  Practical
wisdom, then, must be utilized when making the appropriate ethical
decision in relation to the moral situation at hand.
129
Corriero applied Aristotle's moral philosophy to the impulsiveness of
adolescents. 130 He specified how such impetuousness affects the criminal
responsibility of juvenile offenders, especially when considering the issue
of waiver. In addition, Corriero explained how Aristotle's ethical precepts
and the Aristotelian method of persuasion can be employed by judges.
Specifically, he indicated how judges can assist transferred juveniles gain
perspective on their behavior by engaging the youthful offender "in a
process of remembrance, of empathetic association.' 131 In light of these
ethical frameworks, this Article examines the prevailing ethical reasoning
120 ARISTOTLE, supra note 16.
121 WILLIAMS & ARRIGO, supra note 17, at 255-56.
122 ARISTOTLE, supra note 16.
123 ALBANESE, supra note 112, at 14-15; WILLIAMS & ARRIGO, supra note 17, at 260.
124 ARISTOTLE, supra note 16, at 22.
125 WILLIAMS & ARRiGO, supra note 17, at 257.
126 ALBANESE, supra note 112, at 16.
127 ARISTOTLE, supra note 16, at 31.
121 Id. at 32.
129 WILLIAMS & ARRIGO, supra note 17, at 260.
130 CORRIERO, supra note 37, at 25-27.
3 ' Id. at 87.
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that informs the judicial intent for court decisions regarding issues of
adolescent transfer, developmental maturity, and competency to stand trial.
III. METHOD
This research investigates the underlying ethical reasoning
communicated in various state supreme court and state appellate court
decisions that address adolescent waiver, developmental immaturity, and
competency to stand trial where automatic transfer is employed. 32 In this
instance, "ethical reasoning" refers to those moral philosophical concepts or
principles that guide, impact, or otherwise underscore the courts'
interpretations and judgments of the legal issues at hand. 133 In order to
systematically examine this matter, a targeted assessment of the
jurisprudential intent found within each case will be featured.
Jurisprudential intent refers to an assessment of the "judicial construction of
the opinion," based on a careful analysis of its wording or language, in
which the court's essential or plain meaning is more fully revealed.1
34
Ascertaining the link between the courts' underlying ethical reasoning and
their jurisprudential intent represents something of a qualitative and
interpretive endeavor. However, as other researchers have noted, legal
inquiries of this sort allow investigators to reflect upon various aspects of
juridical decision-making in which the contexts that socially organize the
law are made more explicit.' 35 Moreover, consistent with this logic, other
commentators have noted that this qualitative approach helps to more
expressly unpack "how and for whom justice is served.'
36
Before any interpretive analysis was undertaken, specific criteria were
established to determine which court cases would be considered for
examination. First, an initial search on LexisNexis was conducted for key
terms. Those words and phrases included "juvenile transfer," "competency
to stand trial," and "maturity." "Juvenile transfer" was chosen over
132 Initially, the search for relevant cases to evaluate focused on decisions rendered by
the United States Supreme Court. However, the specific parameters informing the
identification of such cases-juvenile (automatic) transfer, developmental maturity, and trial
fitness-did not yield any results. Consequently, attention was subsequently directed toward
state supreme court and appellate court cases that met the criteria.
133 RICHARD PAUL & LINDA ELDER, UNDERSTANDING THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICAL
REASONING (2006), available at http://www.criticalthinking.org/store-page.cfm?P-
products&ItemlD=169&cataloglD=224&catelD=132; VINCENT RYAN RUGGIERO, BEYOND
FEELINGS: A GUIDE TO CRITICAL THINKING (7th ed. 2004).
134 Bruce A. Arrigo, Justice and the Deconstruction of Psychological Jurisprudence: The
Case of Competency to Stand Trial, 7 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 55, 59 (2003).
135 Reza Banakar & Max Travers, Studying Legal Texts, in THEORY AND METHOD IN
SOCIO-LEGAL RESEARCH 133, 134 (Reza Banaker & Max Travers eds., 2005).
136 Arrigo, supra note 134, at 55.
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"juvenile waiver" because a preliminary search with the latter term yielded
cases primarily involving waiver of rights; the former term, however,
yielded cases specifically regarding juvenile transfer practices.
Additionally, "competency to stand trial" was selected over the relatively
new usage "adjudicative competency" because the latter phrase produced
no results; the former expression, however, led to the retrieval of several
court decisions. "Maturity" was chosen over "immaturity" because the
former usage is the root of the developmental question courts consider,
thereby making it more likely to reveal cases that examine aspects of youth
development. With these criteria in mind, the LexisNexis search yielded
seven court cases. These judicial decisions included the following: Tate v.
State,137 M.D. v. State,'38 Stanford v. Kentucky,139 State v. Gonzales,140 Otis
v. State,141 People v. Hana,142 and State v. McCracken.1
43
An eighth case, In re Causey,144 was also identified. However, it was
not included in the analysis for clear and compelling reasons. While
Causey appears to be the only court decision that recognizes that a juvenile
may be incompetent to stand trial due to developmental immaturity alone,
the case's outcome originated in juvenile court. Since Causey assesses
competency to stand trial and immaturity only in delinquency proceedings,
it must be excluded because the present inquiry investigates cases dealing
with juvenile waiver-particularly direct-file or statutory exclusion-where
issues of developmental maturity and competency to stand trial are featured.
The next step in the selection of cases was to determine which of them
dealt with direct-file or statutory exclusion (automatic transfer) instead of
traditional judicial waiver. Both M.D. v. State145 and People v. Hana146 are
judicial waiver cases; consequently, they were excluded from consideration.
State v. Gonzales147 is a New Mexico case. This case is unique in that New
Mexico does not have a typical transfer system, instead relying on a
blended sentencing provision. 148 With this provision, juvenile defendants
are classified into three different categories: delinquent offenders, youthful
117 864 So. 2d 44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
138 701 So. 2d 58 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997).
3 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
140 24 P.3d 776 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
... 142 S.W.3d 615 (Ark. 2004).
142 524 N.W.2d 682 (Mich. 1994).
14' 615 N.W.2d 902 (Neb. 2000).
'44 363 So. 2d 472 (La. 1978).
"' 701 So. 2d 58 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997).
146 524 N.W.2d at 682.
"' 24 P.3d 776 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
148 See N.M. STAT. § 32A (2008).
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offenders, and serious youthful offenders. Delinquent offenders are
charged in children's court, while serious youthful offenders may be direct-
filed to adult court when over age fifteen and following the commission of
first-degree murder. 149 Further, youthful offenders who are fourteen years
of age or older and who commit one of twelve violent felonies are subject
to a judicial hearing to assess amenability to treatment, serious nature of the
crime, maturity, prior record, etc. This protocol is similar to a judicial
waiver hearing. 15 ° Gonzales was classified as a youthful offender. Since
the New Mexico form of judicial hearing applied in this instance, 15' the case
was excluded from review.
Stanford v. Kentucky'52 was excluded because the decision was
overturned by the subsequent case of Roper v. Simmons.153 While Roper
did in fact discuss juvenile transfer and maturity, it did not adequately
address the issue of competency to stand trial, but instead focused on capital
punishment of juveniles in light of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment. 154 Thus, this court decision was excluded
from consideration.
Otis v. State 55 and State v. McCracken5 6 were identified as direct-file
cases and, as such, were retained for the analysis. Tate v. State'57 is slightly
different than the two cases previously mentioned. As a Florida decision,
Tate is different because Florida requires that juvenile offenders under age
fourteen be indicted before they are direct-filed for adult criminal trial
purposes. 58 However, since the grand jury hearing to indict Tate was not
149 Id. § 32A-2-3(H).
"S0 Id. § 32A-2-20(C).
151 Gonzales, 24 P.3d at 782.
152 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
153 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
154 U.S. CONST. amend VIII. The criteria for case selection specifically required that the
decision: (1) involve automatic or direct file juvenile transfer, (2) discuss developmental
immaturity, and (3) review the competency-to-stand-trial doctrine. Roper is an automatic
transfer case in which the defendant, Simmons, is described as "very immature," "very
impulsive," "and very susceptible to being manipulated or influenced." 543 U.S. at 559.
However, the trial fitness of Simmons is not raised by the Court, despite these deficits.
Instead, the defendant's age is mentioned as a factor that limits the immature youth from
reaching the threshold requirements to be sentenced to death. As such, Roper fundamentally
represents a death penalty case, in which the Court's concern for age and developmental
immaturity are used to explain why such juveniles cannot be deemed as the most deserving
for execution. Given the absence of a discussion on the important issue of defendant
Roper's competency, the case was excluded.
' 142 S.W.3d 615 (Ark. 2004).
156 615 N.W.2d 902 (Neb. 2000).
"' 864 So. 2d 44, 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
158 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.56 (2008).
2009]
BRIAN G. SELLERS & BRUCE A. ARRIGO
representative of a traditional judicial waiver hearing and only examined
whether sufficient clear and convincing evidence existed to proceed to
criminal trial, 59 this case was included in the analysis.
Having determined which cases addressed adolescent transfer,
developmental maturity, and competency to stand trial in the context of
mandated waiver, these decisions were then Shepardized. In other words, at
issue were those subsequent court decisions that cited Otis, McCracken, and
Tate, relying on these respective rulings for jurisprudential guidance.
Moreover, each list of cases generated from these three Shepardized
summaries was then scrutinized. The point of this examination was to
ascertain whether each opinion discussed juvenile transfer, competency to
stand trial, and developmental maturity within the context of automatic
waiver. Given these specific selection parameters, several cases were
immediately excluded from consideration. However, the case of Williams
v. State160 was deemed acceptable, especially since it was a direct-file
decision exploring the issue of a juvenile's competency to stand trial as an
adult in lieu of evidence suggesting developmental immaturity and low I.Q.
Accordingly, the Williams decision was included in the analysis.
Finally, for purposes of thoroughness, the specific legal cases cited
within Otis, McCracken, and Tate were reviewed to see if they met the
criteria for inclusion in the analysis. Following this investigation, two
additional court decisions were identified. State v. Nevels161 was cited in
McCracken.162 It was chosen for inclusion because the court weighed
several arguments made by various mental health professionals regarding
the psychosocial factors affecting one's maturity that impacted whether
defendant Nevels was competent to stand trial in an adult criminal
setting.1 63 Brazill v. State164 was cited in Tate. It was selected for inclusion
because the court explored the rationale underlying Florida's indictment
and direct-file process of juvenile offenders as well as the extent to which
this protocol failed to adequately assess a youth's competency and
suitability to stand trial in adult court. 165 Overall, this study analyzed six
cases: Otis v. State, State v. McCracken, Tate v. State, Williams v. State,
State v. Nevels, and Brazill v. State.
159 Tate, 864 So. 2d at 47.
239 S.W.3d 44 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006).
161 453 N.W.2d 579 (Neb. 1990).
112 615 N.W.2d 902, 916 (Neb. 2000).
163 Nevels, 453 N.W.2d at 584-88.
164 845 So. 2d 282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
165 Id. at 288.
[Vol. 99
ADOLESCENT TRANSFER
Having identified the six state supreme court and appellate court cases
that fit the specific criteria for review, two levels of qualitative analysis
were applied to each of them.166 First, a targeted assessment of the plain
meaning was emphasized in which the jurisprudential intent was discerned.
Past applications of the "plain meaning rule" have sought to extrapolate the
"textual context" as well as the "ordinary usage" of particular terms within
statutes in order to unearth legislative intent.' 67  However, other
commentators believe that this strategy is deceptive, especially since
determinations regarding meaning reside in the complex perspectives of the
statute's creator(s). 1 68 Thus, interpretive analyses of legal texts are better
served by seeking jurisprudential plain meaning from judicial decisions
themselves. Indeed, this approach is preferred over any attempt to peer into
the minds of legislators in which the "broader systems of meaning" that
inform and underscore a court's rulings are determined. 169 As such, this
variation in application of the plain meaning rule was employed in order to
undertake an interpretive analysis of the legal language expressed in the six
judicial opinions that constitute this data set.
In order to facilitate the process of eliciting information on plain
meaning in which underlying jurisprudential intent was specified, a series
of questions were posed to each case. These queries are consistent with the
recommendations for undertaking qualitative inquiry as described by
Ritchie and Spencer. 170 The questions consisted of the following:
(1) What are the dimensions of attitudes or perceptions that are held?
(2) What factors underlie particular attitudes or perceptions?
(3) Why are decisions or actions taken, or not taken?
(4) Why do particular needs arise?
(5) Why are services or programs not being used?
166 The six cases that were examined did not have dissenting opinions. Accordingly,
only the majority opinions were analyzed to retrieve data for the two levels of analysis.
167 See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning ": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of
Strict Statutory Construction, 17 IARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (1994); Scott Phillips &
Ryken Grattet, Judicial Rhetoric, Meaning-Making, and the Institutionalization of Hate
Crime Law, 34 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 567 (2000); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain
Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (1994).
169 See Darryl K. Brown, Plain Meaning, Practical Reason, and Culpability: Toward a
Theory of Jury Interpretation of Criminal Statutes, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1199 (1998); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 61 (1994).
169 Phillips & Grattet, supra note 167, at 569; see also Easterbrook, supra note 168.
170 Jane Ritchie & Liz Spencer, Qualitative Data Analysis for Applied Policy Research,
in THE QUALITATIVE RESEARCHER'S COMPANION 305, 307 (A. Michael Huberman &
Matthew B. Miles eds., 2002).
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(6) What are the goals, purposes, and concerns of the decisions or
actions taken, or not taken?
(7) What needs of society are represented by the decisions or actions
taken, or not taken?
171
The first two questions evaluate how the court perceives the legal
issues and controversies it confronts, while endeavoring to pinpoint those
factors affecting these attitudes. For example, does the court rule in favor
of automatic forms of adolescent waiver because juvenile crime is
perceived as a severe threat, overshadowing any competence-related
concerns of the defendant? Questions 3 through 5 denote the judicial
motivations and rationales that underscore particular judgments as the court
assesses certain forms of punishment over others. To illustrate, does the
court view the violent juvenile offender as mature enough to receive adult
sanctions over rehabilitative programming because a get-tough-on-youth-
crime logic informs judicial decision-making? The final two questions
examine phrases used within the legal decisions that potentially reveal what
the court values in regard to adolescent waiver, developmental maturity,
and competency to stand trial. For example, does "greater societal
protection" take precedence over individual rights?
Collectively, then, when applied to the six court cases under
consideration, these seven questions enabled a more careful reading of the
legal language employed by jurists. Emphasis on this discourse or wording
functioned as a basis to review the plain meaning in which underlying
jurisprudential intent could then be extracted. As such, the process
followed here examined the substance of juridical language and the extent
to which this substance provided "clues" to the court's essential meaning,
especially when filtered through the seven queries previously delineated.
To be clear, information gathered on jurisprudential intent is not the
same as specifying the fundamental ethical reasoning conveyed by or
through this intent. To address this matter, a second layer of qualitative
analysis was applied to the six court decisions. This second level of inquiry
was textual in orientation. 172  In this instance, the legal language that
constituted jurisprudential intent was subjected to close scrutiny in order to
better ascertain what it meant ethically.
Previous inquiries have used this strategy of undertaking textual legal
analysis.1 73 However, none have investigated the content of jurisprudential
171 Id. at 307.
172 Claire Macken, Preventive Detention and the Right to Personal Liberty and Security
Under Article 5 ECHR, 10 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 195 (2006).
173 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ARRIGO, MADNESS, LANGUAGE AND THE LAW (1993); Arrigo,
supra note 134; Bruce A. Arrigo, Martial Metaphors and Medical Justice: Implications for
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intent and translated it into ethical reasoning. Thus, the second layer of
qualitative analysis is somewhat novel. As a basis to understand the
essential ethical reasoning communicated through the court's perspective on
adolescent (automatic) transfer, developmental maturity, and trial fitness,
this component of the method was deemed absolutely essential.
Accordingly, for purposes of the present inquiry, this second level of
qualitative inquiry consisted of the following steps.
First, mindful of the data retrieved that specified underlying
jurisprudential intent (that is, the information elicited on plain meaning
given the seven questions posed to each of the six court decisions), the
particular textual context in which these findings appeared in the case was
considered. Second, having identified this actual textual context, the words
or phrases themselves were examined. In each instance, the terms or
expressions were evaluated in relation to the three schools of ethics
consequentialism, including ethical egoism, contractualism, and
utilitarianism; formalism; and virtue-based philosophy. This step in the
analysis determined the "manifest content," that is, what actually was
said. 174 Moreover, it facilitated an understanding of the deeper ethical
meaning embedded in the courts' language. For example, terms or
expressions located in a case that addressed underlying jurisprudential
intent by reference to competing interests such as "greater societal
protection" or "individual rights" represented manifest content. However,
they were categorized as a utilitarian argument, given the philosophical
principles this school of thought embraces. Conversely, actual words or
phrases found in a case that reflected underlying jurisprudential intent by
employing "moral duty" or "responsibility" also represented manifest
content. However, these notions are consistent with the logic of Kantian
ethics or formalism and, as such, were classified as consistent with this
school of ethical thought. In those instances where the jurisprudential
intent did not translate into or otherwise convey ethical reasoning, this legal
language was not subjected to additional textual analyses.
Third, individual words or expressions situated in a case emanating
from underlying jurisprudential intent are insufficient for purposes of
deciphering the more complete ethical reasoning conveyed through such
intent. Thus, the presence of these terms or phrases as found across the six
cases included a thematic analysis. This is a reference to the extent to
which each case, as well as the collective cases, employed one type of
ethical reasoning over others. Thematic analysis as specified here was
Law, Crime, and Deviance, 27 J. POL. & MIL. Soc. 307 (1999); Macken, supra note 172.
174 OLE R. HOLSTI, CONTENT ANALYSIS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES 12
(1969) (emphasis omitted).
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facilitated by a review of the manifest content in each court decision and the
meanings of these contents in relation to the three schools of ethical
thought. In this respect, the meanings per case constituted a data set in
which an assessment of the moral philosophy that conveyed the underlying
jurisprudential intent was enumerated (1) from court decision to court
decision and (2) across the six cases. Stated differently, the thematic
analysis led to an identification of the primary ethical rationale that
underscored the court's regard for mandated adolescent transfer,
developmental maturity, and competency to stand trial in each court
decision and across these respective judicial decisions.
To summarize, the method employed in this study engaged in two
levels of qualitative analysis. The first layer elicited information on
underlying jurisprudential intent by focusing on plain meaning as found in
the six court cases under consideration. Several specific questions guided
this inquiry. A second layer of analysis reviewed this intent by re-situating
it within the actual words or phrases the court employed in rendering its
decisions. This activity drew attention to the manifest content whose
fundamental meaning-essential ethical reasoning-remained concealed.
To discern such reasoning, each instance of manifest content was
interpreted, mindful of the principles and logic that inform the three schools
of ethical thought considered. Finally, in order to gauge the court's overall
moral philosophy regarding adolescent automatic transfer, developmental
maturity, and competency to stand trial, a thematic analysis was employed.
Specifically, the collective ethical meanings located in each case and across
all of them were evaluated.
IV. DISCUSSION
Appendix A lists key concepts and exact quotes as derived from the
court cases that summarily represent the responses to the seven questions
posed to these legal decisions. Collectively, the data reflect the various
attitudes, perceptions, goals, purposes, and concerns that form the basis for
specifying the courts' underlying jurisprudential intent on the matter of
adolescent transfer, adjudicative competence, and developmental
immaturity. Appendix B identifies the particular phrases situated within the
individual cases themselves that convey moral philosophical themes or
related rationales. Thus, the data in Appendix B disclose what the
jurisprudential intent of each case means ethically.
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A. LEVEL 1 ANALYSIS
The data collected from Tate v. State17 5 yielded several clues regarding
the court's underlying jurisprudential intent. Specifically, statements made
in this opinion conveyed the perception that "there is no absolute right
requiring children to be treated in a special system for juvenile offenders"
17 6
and that "the common law presumption of incapacity of a minor between
the ages of seven and fourteen years to commit a crime no longer
applies."'177  Thus, the Tate court upheld the attitude that the state's
"statutory scheme,"'178 which "supplanted the common law defense of
'infancy,'"'. 7 9 is sufficient to make the assertion that "competency hearings
are not, per se, mandated simply because a child is tried as an adult."' 80
The court buttressed its perspective with the observation that "it is not
unreasonable for the legislature to treat children who commit serious crimes
as adults in order to protect societal goals."' 8' Moreover, mindful of its
articulated perspective, the Tate court stated that it had the "obligation"'
82
to make certain that young juveniles with apparent deficits be competent to
stand trial.
Questions 3 through 5 elicited the court's rationale regarding its
decision to ensure that Tate, the juvenile, was competent to stand trial. The
court's opinion that "Tate was entitled to a complete evaluation and
hearing," 183 was motivated by "the argument that the proper inquiry was
whether the defendant may be incompetent, not whether he is
incompetent,"'184 especially since he was only twelve and this was his first
offense. Initially the trial court overlooked this argument; thus, the Tate
court determined that in light of Tate's age, any doubt in fitness to stand
trial should be eliminated by a complete competency evaluation. 85 In other
words, due to his age, there was a possibility that Tate was incompetent to
stand trial.
However, other statements in the decision expressed no objection to
current transfer practices and the adult sanctions that youthful offenders
therefore face. For example, the Tate court communicated its approval of
... 864 So. 2d 44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
176 Id. at 52.
... Id. at 53.
178 id.
179 Id.
8o Id. at 50.
181 Id. at 54.
182 Id. at 51.
183 Id. at 50.
184 Id. at 51.
185 Id. at 46-47.
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transfer trends and subsequent sanctions with the following observation:
"[W]e reject the argument that a life sentence without the possibility of
parole is cruel or unusual punishment on a twelve-year-old child"'
8 6
because "[s]entences imposed on juveniles [as adults] of life imprisonment
are not uncommon in Florida Courts.' 87 Indeed, consistent with the logic
of favoring juvenile transfer trends, the Tate court opined that "it is not
unreasonable for the legislature to treat children who commit serious crime
as adults in order to protect societal goals."'' 88 Thus, previous arguments
made by the Tate court in which it maintained that "there is no absolute
right requiring children to be treated in a special system for juvenile
offenders"' 89 and "competency hearings are not, per se, mandated simply
because a child is tried as an adult,"' 90 suggest that competing interests are
jurisprudentially weighed. These are interests in which "societal goals"
take precedence over individual rights. Although the Tate court recognized
the responsibility to determine a juvenile offender's trial fitness in criminal
proceedings when the offender was "less than the age of fourteen,"' 9 1 it
nonetheless perceived such offenders as a severe threat to society. Thus,
the issue of public safety compelled the court to conclude that it was
reasonable for serious youthful offenders to be treated as adults.
In Otis v. State,'92 the court's jurisprudential intent was similar to the
reasoning adopted in Tate. This perspective was clearly conveyed in the
following statement: "[I]t can be inferred from the serious and violent
nature of the offense that the protection of society demands that Otis be
tried as an adult."' 93 In addition, the Otis court held the perception that
"while Otis's lack of sophistication and maturity may be mitigating factors,
they are not of such a nature to warrant a transfer to juvenile court.
t 94
When the factors underlying these perceptions are examined more closely,
several declarations made by the Otis court indicate how the court weighed
the various criteria that must be assessed to determine if a direct-filed youth
should be transferred back to juvenile jurisdiction. For example, as the
majority opined, "the trial court [was] not required to give equal weight to
each of the statutory factors,"' 95 "the State was not required to put on proof
186 Id. at 54.
187 Id. (quoting Blackshear v. State, 771 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
188 Id.
189 Id. at 52.
19' Id. at 50.
'9' Id. at 51.
192 142 S.W.3d 615 (Ark. 2004).
193 Id. at 607.
194 Id. at 625.
195 Id. at 609.
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of each statutory factor,"'1 96 and "each factor need not be supported by clear
and convincing evidence."'1 9 Furthermore, in Otis, the court reasoned that
"the second factor does not require proof of premeditation; rather, the
second factor pertains to whether the alleged offense was committed in an
aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner." 198  Thus, when
considering the rights of the individual versus the goals of society, the Otis
court endorsed the view that the defendant's "lack of sophistication and
maturity '99 gave sway to the "protection of society, ' '20 particularly
because of the violent nature of the crime.
Hence, the intent of the Otis decision seems both plain and clear. In
short, the discretion of the trial court warrants endorsement so that it can
gauge the importance of statutory factors when reviewing those interests
that are most important when reaching a decision about whether a youth
predisposed to a "lack of sophistication and maturity" should be tried as an
adult.20 1 Moreover, the emphasis placed on "the serious and violent nature
of the offense," as well as the court's contention that it "[did] not require
proof of premeditation," but only "whether the alleged offense was
committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner,"
suggested that "the protection of society" was paramount.20 2
In State v. McCracken,20 3 the concept of interest-balancing was made
obvious when the court delineated the criteria and process used to
determine if criminal trial proceedings should be supplanted by decision-
making in juvenile court. The McCracken court explained that "'[i]t is a
balancing test by which public protection and societal security are weighed
against the practical and nonproblematical rehabilitation of the juvenile,"'
wherein "'[t]here are no weighted factors and no prescribed method[s] by
which more or less weight is assigned to each specific factor.'"204 Despite
the evidence detailing that "McCracken's age of 13 [years] favored
transferring jurisdiction; [that] McCracken had no prior criminal
history... ; [and that] McCracken's sophistication and maturity was
unclear," the court supported the district court's reasoning that "'without
question' the best interests of the juvenile and the security of the public
196 Id. at 626.
197 Id. at 610.
198 Id. at 608.
... Id. at 609.
200 Id. at 607.
21 Id. at 609.
202 Id. at 608, 613.
203 615 N.W.2d 902 (Neb. 2000), overruled on other grounds by State v. Thomas, 637
N.W.2d 632 (Neb. 2002).
204 Id. (quoting State v. Mantich, 543 N.W.2d 181 (Neb. 1996)).
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require[d] that the district court retain jurisdiction, especially since the
crime was so violent and McCracken's psychiatric prognosis was so
poor.,
20 5
Given that the defendant's "crime involved extreme violence, 20 6 other
noteworthy factors-age and maturity level-were overshadowed in the
court's "balancing test" assessment. Indeed, the majority's perception and
attitude toward the brutal nature of the offense revealed the court's punitive
resolve designed to ensure "public protection and societal security. 20 7 To
illustrate, the McCracken court upheld the district court's ruling that "'it is
not appropriate that [the accused] be treated as a juvenile, because of the
extreme risk of danger that he presents to himself and society.'
20 8
Moreover, the court expressed its concern for the seriousness of the crime
in several instances throughout the opinion. For example, the majority in
McCracken agreed with the district court's description of the offense as
being "of a particularly violent and aggressive nature, ,209 and as
representative of an "extremely violent nature. 2 °10 Finally, the court's more
punitive intention was reinforced when it opined that "the record therefore
reveals that the district court's decision to retain jurisdiction rested, to a
great extent, upon the nature of the offense with which McCracken was
charged."
211
The unequivocal language the court employed when commenting on
the violent nature of the crime made evident its rationale for concluding that
public protection was more important than the defendant's age and level of
maturity. This perspective was summarily disclosed in the following
passage:
In spite of McCracken's youthful age at the time of the crime, the extreme violence
perpetrated upon the victim and the protection of the public in light of McCracken's
poor psychiatric prognosis lead us to conclude that the district court did not abuse its




Thus, the McCracken court concurred with the district court's opinion
that the defendant should "be held accountable through proceedings in the
205 Id. at 916. Darren McCracken had retrieved a handgun from the bedroom of his
mother, Vicky Bray. He then loaded the handgun and used it to shoot Bray twice in her head
as she slept on the sofa in the downstairs family room.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 915.




212 Id. at 916-17.
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adult criminal justice system for effective deterrence of future antisocial
misconduct."2'3
In Williams v. State,2 14 the circuit court also made several statements
that conveyed concern for the violent nature of those crimes committed by
the juvenile defendant and the danger such wrongful acts posed toward the
public's safety. To illustrate, the court asserted that "Williams's offenses
were serious; ... they were committed in an aggressive, violent, and
premeditated manner and ... the protection of society required prosecution
in the criminal division of circuit court., 215 Interestingly, Williams was
diagnosed with a "borderline" I.Q.; that is, he "function[ed] at a lower-than-
average range., 216 However, based on the psychiatric testimony-the court
noted Dr. Paul Deyoub's expert conclusions-"Williams had no mental
disease or defect, was competent to proceed to trial, had no problems
understanding the criminality of his actions, and had the ability to conform
his conduct to the law., 2 17 As such, the court perceived the "evidence
showing that Williams had great culpability in a serious crime" to be
sufficient to prosecute him in an adult court.218  Consistent with
McCracken, the Williams decision hinged on the violent nature of the
crimes committed. 21 9 Absent diagnosed psychiatric illness or disability, the
defendant was competent to stand trial in a criminal court, especially since
the offenses "were committed in an aggressive, violent, and premeditated
manner." 220 Here, too, the underlying rationale for this determination was
in the furtherance of societal goals and needs-specifically, the "protection
of society."
221
In State v. Nevels, 2 the court communicated its perspective regarding
the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders and the maintenance of the public's
general welfare. In particular, the court opined that while "rehabilitation
has traditionally played a key role in the treatment of young
offenders .... [T]he concept of deterrence and the need to balance
213 Id. at 916.
214 239 S.W.3d 44 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006).
215 Id. at 46.
216 Id. at 48.
217 Id. at 46.
218 Id. at 48.
219 Robert Lee Williams, Jr., and an accomplice, Kevin Barton, entered the home of
Alena Tate, a seventy-four-year-old woman with Alzheimer's disease, with the intent to steal
her car. During the robbery, Tate was struck in the head and then fatally shot in the neck
area. In addition, Williams also admitted to a second robbery-related homicide prior to the
attack on Tate.
221 Id. at 46.
221 Id.
222 453 N.W.2d 579 (Neb. 1990).
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individual justice with the needs of society... also have a place in the
juvenile justice system. 2 23  This language makes clear that the court
intended to adopt a "balancing test" standard in which competing rights and
224needs were subjected to jurisprudential scrutiny. Moreover, the Nevels
court stipulated that "[t]here is no arithmetical computation or formula
required in a court's consideration of the statutory criteria of factors" and
"the court need not resolve every factor against the juvenile., 225 Thus, the
attitude endorsed in Nevels was one in which an assessment of those factors
that outweigh others rightfully falls within the court's discretion.
Numerous accounts from mental health experts raised concerns for
defendant Nevels's ability to stand trial in an adult criminal setting.226 For
example, commenting on his personality difficulties, one forensic specialist
indicated that the defendant's problems stemmed from a "lack of identity in
that Nevels engage[d] in negative behavior which [made] him feel more
secure about his black, male identity and which secure[d] acceptance in his
peer group[s]. 227 Additional testimony as reported in the case intimated
that the accused "suffer[ed] from several disorders and disabilities,
including a mixed developmental disorder involving several speech-and
language-base[d] learning disabilities ....,,22 8 Moreover, restating the
psychiatric evidence proffered, the Nevels court indicated that this particular
deficit was only compounded by a:
"[C]onduct disorder socialized aggressive," which means Nevels is aggressive
during periods of anxiety and has difficulty in conforming his behavior to the norms
of society; a major depressive disorder ... and an adolescent identity disorder which
means Nevels is "still ... in the process of forming his own identity, [and] [is] very
immature.. 229
These diagnoses led one psychiatrist to conclude that the defendant
,,230was "treatable because he [did] not yet have a fixed personality ... . A
second forensic expert similarly deduced that "Nevels'[s] disorders [were]
treatable as evidenced by his favorable response to treatment" and that
"mainstreaming Nevels into an adult prison population 'would probably be
[devastating].'
2 31
223 Id. at 587 (quoting State in Interest of C.A.H., 446 A.2d 93, 98 (N.J. 1982)).
224 Id. at 588.
225 Id. at 587 (quoting State v. Alexander, 339 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1983)).
226 Id. at 583-85.
227 Id. at 585.
228 Id. at 583.
229 Id. at 583-84.
230 Id. at 585.
231 Id. at 584.
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Despite the varied testimony of medical specialists documenting the
bases for the defendant's misconduct, the court rejected it. Indeed,
notwithstanding the significant psychosocial factors raised by mental health
professionals, the underlying rationale informing the court's perspective
was located elsewhere. In short, the Nevels majority ruled that "[a]s the
trier of fact, the district court was not required to take the opinions of
experts as binding upon it." 232 To reinforce this jurisprudential attitude, the
court offered a number of arguments.
For example, the court speculated that "if Nevels'[s] case were to have
been transferred to the juvenile court, he might have viewed the transfer as
his manipulation of the system and [he might] not [have taken]
responsibility for the crime." 233 The court adopted this view, especially
since it found "the facilities available to the juvenile court would not
provide enough protection to the public. 234  More consideration was
therefore given to the general welfare than to Nevels's developmental
immaturity. In support of this logic, the court stipulated that the accused
had "repeatedly violated the law and performed other antisocial acts,
culminating in [a] very violent and cruel beating .... ,235 Elsewhere, the
court acknowledged Dr. Joseph Palombi's opinion that "an individual's
future dangerousness" could not be predicted by mental health
professionals.236 Consequently, the Nevels court opined that "in addition to
considering the defendant's age, [it was] 'obliged to consider protection of
the public and deterrence,' 237 because "dealing with Nevels in the juvenile
court system might diminish the seriousness of the offense. 2 38 Once again,
and consistent with prior cases on the matter, an assessment of the plain
legal language yielded underlying jurisprudential intent. Nevels needed to
be prosecuted in criminal court to protect society and in order to deter
239future violent juvenile offenses z.
232 Id. at 587.
233 Id. at 588.
234 id.
235 Id. at 582. Eugene Nnakwe made sexual overtures toward the defendant, Nevels. A
struggle ensued between the two. Nnakwe was taken to the ground, where Nevels proceeded
to stomp, kick, and strike him. Nnakwe was then dragged by Nevels, with the help of Jason
Daniels, forty feet away, where Nevels began to strike Nnakwe in the chest and head with a
metal tire iron. Later, Nevels pulled a pine branch from a tree and began striking Nnakwe
with it, and then stole his car keys and left the area. Id. at 582-83.
236 Id. at 584.
237 Id. at 588.
231 Id. at 586.
239 Id. at 588.
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A review of the data in Brazill v. State240 indicates that this ruling
mirrors the opinions of the cases previously analyzed. Specifically, the
Brazill court stated that "the legislature was entitled to conclude that the
parens patriae function of the juvenile system would not work for certain
juveniles, or that society demanded greater protection from these offenders
than that provided by that system."241 Moreover, the decision in Brazill
reaffirmed prior court holdings when it opined that "there is no absolute
right conferred by common law, constitution, or otherwise, requiring
children to be treated in a special system for juvenile offenders. 242 The
court in Brazill conveyed its motivation here when noting that "[i]t is not
unreasonable for the legislature to treat children who commit serious crimes
as adults in order to protect societal goals. 243 In addition, the Brazill court
embraced the perspective that "[t]he legislature could reasonably have
determined that for some crimes the rehabilitative aspect of juvenile court
must give way to punishment., 244 The court's rationale for adopting such
perceptions is embedded in several comments. To illustrate, the Brazill
majority observed that "[t]he legislature has the power to determine who, if
anyone, is entitled to treatment as a juvenile. 245  Elsewhere, the court
reasoned that "the discretion of a prosecutor in deciding whether and how to
prosecute is absolute in our system of criminal justice. 246 With these two
statements, the Brazill court summarily approved statutory exclusion and
direct-file laws.
Brazill raised numerous concerns about how the transfer practices in
Florida did not adequately assess whether a juvenile should stand trial in
criminal court. Drawing attention to the relevant state statute, the court
argued that "Section 985.56 does not require a court to hold a hearing to
decide whether adult sanctions are appropriate.,2 47 Brazill proffered an
additional objection by specifying that Section 985.56 permitted "the state
to bypass a hearing on the suitability of adult sanctions by [first] securing
an indictment., 248 Therefore, the automatic waiver practices of Florida
provided a statutory loophole in which prosecutors could direct-file
juveniles like Brazill (aged thirteen) into criminal proceedings without
initially having to undertake a thorough assessment of the child's
240 845 So. 2d 282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
241 Id. at 288 (quoting Woodard v. Wainwright, 566 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977)).
242 Id. at 287.
243 Id. at 288.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 287.
246 Id. at 289 (quoting State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361, 1367 (Fla. 1980)).




competency to stand trial as an adult. This legislative rationale in support
of automatic transfer is made most evident wherein Section 985.56
stipulates that it "applies to '[a] child of any age who is charged with a
violation of state law punishable by death or life imprisonment' . . . . It
does not differentiate between age groups. 2 49
The decision in Brazill was motivated by a concern for societal
interests over and against the protection of individual rights. The court
emphasized an "interest in crime deterrence and public safety," and
acknowledged that "society demanded greater protection
from... offenders. 250  Thus, the court's jurisprudential intent in Brazill
was consistent with prior court rulings on mandated adolescent waiver,
developmental maturity, and competency to stand trial. The societal goals
of safety and security were balanced against the rights and interests of the
youthful offender.
B. LEVEL 2 ANALYSIS
The second level of our textual analysis re-situated each instance of
jurisprudential intent within the specific case under scrutiny. The aim of
this endeavor was to interpret what this legal language (manifest content)
communicated ethically (that is, the deeper meaning embedded in the words
and phrases themselves). Stated differently, the goal of this particular
inquiry was to determine what moral philosophy was conveyed through
jurisprudential intent, mindful of the three ethical schools of thought under
consideration as well as of their corresponding principles.
Upon a close re-reading of the Tate251 opinion, specific words and
phrases were found signifying a reliance on the consequentialist perspective
of utilitarianism. For example, expressions such as "treat children who
commit serious crimes as adults in order to protect societal goals" 25 2 and
"no absolute right requiring children to be treated in a special system' 253
indicate that two conflicting interests were weighed by the court. In other
words, the manifest content of the opinion indicated that the welfare of the
general public was balanced against the rights of the individual. However,
upon closer investigation, this concept of interest-balancing is most closely
related to the utilitarian principle of ascertaining the greatest good for the
greatest number of people.
249 Id. at 289.
251 Id. at 288.
251 Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
252 Id. at 54.
253 Id. at 52.
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Conversely, other phrases found in the Tate ruling were consistent
with ethical formalism, or Kantian moral philosophy. To illustrate, the
discussion of an "obligation to ensure that the juvenile defendant.., was
competent ' 254 suggests that the court believed it had a duty or responsibility
to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial. The word
"obligation" clearly implies duty, which formalism recognizes as a moral
maxim or categorical imperative. Thus, the deeper ethical meaning located
in the jurisprudential intent of the Tate decision communicated both the
logic of utilitarianism as well as formalism.
Similarly to the Tate ruling, Otis v. State255 appropriated legal
language that, when re-evaluated for its ethical significance, endorsed
utilitarian objectives. For example, phrases such as "not required to give
equal weight to each of the statutory factors"2 56 and "society demands
greater protection from serious offenders, 257 once again signaled an
interest-balancing argument. Indeed, the court in Otis considered
competing factors (for instance, age, maturity, severity of the offense)
where determining which of them was more substantive than others was left
to the discretion of the court of first instance. Declarations of this sort
constituted manifest content. Moreover, the court's opinion that "greater
protection" for society outweighed the defendant's "lack of sophistication
and maturity 2 58 similarly conveyed jurisprudential intent and functioned as
manifest content warranting textual exegeses. Thus, when interpreted
ethically, this statement represented an appeal to the greatest happiness
principle articulated within the philosophy of utilitarianism.
In State v. McCracken,259 the court's decision embodied utilitarian
reasoning, as can be seen from an assessment of those key phrases that
reflected its underlying jurisprudential intent. For example, the McCracken
court referred to the case as "a balancing test by which public protection
and societal security [were] weighed against. . . rehabilitation., 260  As
manifest content, this statement amounts to an interest-balancing argument.
Moreover, the court agreed with the lower court's finding that the "best
interests of the juvenile and security of the public ... without question
[weighed] in favor of the court" retaining jurisdiction. 6 1 When interpreted
ethically, the deeper meaning lodged within this legal language is that
24 Id. at 51.
255 142 S.W.3d 615 (Ark. 2004).
256 Id. at 624.
257 Id. at 628.
258 Id. at 609, 613.
259 615 N.W.2d 902 (Neb. 2000).
260 Id. at 915.
261 Id. at 916.
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ensuring protection for the collective good was preferred over the rights and
interests of the individual.
In addition to the utilitarian underpinnings located within
McCracken's jurisprudential intent, there is language in support of formalist
principles. Specifically, the court upheld the lower court's decision that
"McCracken should be held accountable through proceedings in the adult
criminal justice system for effective deterrence of future antisocial
misconduct. 262 The manifest content, "should be held accountable," refers
to the deeper, ethical signification of responsibility. By logical extension,
then, it could be inferred that the court felt a (moral) duty to hold
McCracken "accountable," given the serious crime that he had committed.
Additionally, and consistent with this reasoning, the statement could be
interpreted to mean that the court viewed McCracken as violating a
categorical imperative. As such, he was duty-bound to take responsibility
for his failure to adhere to an unqualified maxim, in the form of adult
accountability for his serious criminal actions committed as a juvenile.
The Williams v. State263 opinion similarly employed legal language
whose underlying jurisprudential intent communicated an ethical
commitment to the philosophy of utilitarianism. To illustrate, the court's
declaration that "protection of society required prosecution in the criminal
division of circuit court ' 264 represented manifest content. However, when
interpreting this phrase within the context of ethical thought, the court's
meaning is consistent with the view that the greatest good for the greatest
number of people was most paramount in the Williams decision. Indeed,
issues such as "age, I.Q., immaturity, and lack of sophistication" were all
eclipsed by a desire to ensure the "protection of society. '265 Here, too, it is
noted how legal language can be subjected to additional textual exegeses
when filtered through the prism of moral philosophy.
In State v. Nevels,266 the court also conveyed its reliance on utilitarian
principles when endorsing a "balancing test" approach.267 In particular, the
Nevels court stated that "the concept of deterrence and the need to balance
individual justice with the needs of society ... also have a place in the
juvenile justice system., 268 Declarations such as these constituted manifest
content. However, when subjected to further textual analysis, the ethical
262 Id.
263 239 S.W.3d 44 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006).
264 Id. at 46.
265 Id. at 48.
266 453 N.W.2d 579 (Neb. 1990).
267 Id. at 587.
268 Id. (quoting State in Interest of C.A.H., 446 A.2d 93, 98 (N.J. 1982)).
2009]
BRIAN G. SELLERS & BRUCE A. ARRIGO
rationale operating here is consistent with the greatest happiness principle.
Moreover, the court's decision to disregard the developmental immaturity
factors raised by defense counsel in favor of pursuing alternative goals that
protected society further communicated the notion that utilitarian objectives
informed Nevels' s underlying jurisprudential intent.
On the other hand, the Nevels court also appropriated language that
when interpreted ethically conveyed fidelity to the philosophy of
formalism. For example, the statement, "we 'are obliged to consider
protection for the public and deterrence' ' 269 represented underlying
jurisprudential intent. Indeed, as manifest content, it indicated a concern for
the collective good in which future harm was to be abated. However, the
deeper level of signification embedded in this phrase ethically implied that
the Nevels court also felt a duty to seek an outcome in support of the
citizenry's general welfare in which future crime prevention was reasonably
assured. Additionally, the expression, "responsibility for the crime,"
communicated formalist sensibilities in that the court believed the
defendant violated a moral maxim and, as such, ought to be held
accountable for it. Moreover, consistent with this logic, the expression's
fundamental meaning suggests that the court understood its moral duty to
hold Nevels responsible for violating a categorical imperative by
committing several antisocial acts that culminated in a very violent and
cruel beating.
Finally, upon review of the jurisprudential intent of the decision in
Brazill v. State,7 ° the ethical meaning endorsed by the court was
compatible with utilitarian principles. For instance, phrases such as
"society demanded greater protection from these offenders than that
provided by that system" and "interest in crime deterrence and public
safety" once again drew attention to an instance in which the court engaged
in an interest-balancing test.27' As manifest content, the court gave societal
protection considerable emphasis, notwithstanding those concerns raised by
Brazill regarding competency and age-related deficits. 272 Moreover, when
interpreting this legal language for its ethical significance, the court's focus
on "greater protection ' 273 for society constituted the linchpin factor in its
decision to not transfer the case to juvenile court. Hence, textual exegeses
of the sort undertaken here affirmed that utilitarian objectives were
conveyed through the court's juridical discourse.
269 Id. at 588 (quoting State v. Alexander, 339 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Neb. 1983)).
270 845 So. 2d 282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).





When considering the ethical reasoning communicated through the
jurisprudential intent for all six court cases, it is overwhelmingly evident
that the philosophy of consequentialism and the principles of utilitarianism
were prominently featured. The themes of "interest balancing" and "the
greatest good for the greatest number" were located throughout each case
and, to a lesser extent, were made patently obvious in some of them.
Indeed, not only did the utilitarian perspective appear most often in the
courts' language usage, but the prestige and reverence afforded this
perspective was far greater than what was found in those passages
endorsing Kantian formalism. While Tate, McCracken, and Nevels clearly
appropriated expressions or phrases consistent with this latter moral
philosophy, the full ethical meaning lodged within these respective
instances of manifest content was not easily ascertainable. Consequently,
the first and second levels of analyses indicate that with regard to the issue
of adolescent (automatic) transfer, developmental maturity, and competency
to stand trial, the primary ethical rationale embedded within the court's
jurisprudential intent is consistent with the logic of utilitarianism. This
finding prevails in each court decision and, correspondingly, across all of
them.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This Article undertook a qualitative examination of state supreme
court and appellate court reasoning on the practice of automatic transfer for
juveniles, where issues of developmental maturity and trial fitness were
notably featured. The first level of analysis focused on plain meaning as
guided by a series of questions that elicited information (in the form of key
words or expressions) specifying the court's underlying jurisprudential
intent. The second level of analysis resituated these terms or phrases within
their respective legal contexts and evaluated them against prevailing moral
philosophical thought as a basis to ascertain the ethical logic communicated
by the court.
Intriguingly, although not surprisingly, the results indicated that
juridical decision-making principally entails a utilitarian balance of
competing interests in which concerns for the public majority's greater
good is esteemed and sought. In other words, it is unremarkable that courts
weigh and value the interests of the state over and against the needs of
youths. This finding is consistent with one main premise of this study.
Simply put, legal tribunals fail to take seriously the empirical findings from
the social and behavioral science community on the manifold confinement,
treatment, and recidivism problems that developmentally immature
adolescents face when automatically waived and deemed fit to stand adult
criminal trial. The traditional hearing conducted by the judicial transfer
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process has been supplanted with direct-file legislative and prosecutorial
waiver. These efforts circumvent any thorough examination of the
juvenile's competence to stand trial. Unlike judicial transfer where, among
other things, development immaturity is assessed, mandated forms of
waiver mostly bypass this critical evaluative practice.
While this investigation produced significant findings regarding the
court's ethical reasoning on the issue of automatic juvenile transfer,
competency to stand trial, and developmental maturity, it also suffered from
several limitations. First, this study addressed a very specific law and
psychology problem that yielded only six court cases warranting textual
scrutiny. The small data set raises questions about the generalizability of
the overall findings. In addition, no statutory analysis on this issue was
undertaken. Undoubtedly, this legislative inquiry would have resulted in a
more complete portrait of the state's underlying intent and the ethical regard
conveyed through that intent. Third, the research method employed was
somewhat novel and clearly interpretive; thus, concerns over whether
various types of quantitative analyses of the law would yield similar
findings warrant future attention. For example, a survey instrument could
be developed in which judges were queried about the moral philosophy they
believed informed their decision-making. Specifically, it would be
noteworthy to evaluate how jurists talk about the ethical reasoning that
informs their decision-making on adolescent waiver as contrasted with what
their court judgments actually say (that is, jurisprudential intent via plain
meaning, as well as moral philosophical logic communicated through that
intent).
These shortcomings notwithstanding, the results delineated draw
attention to a number of unambiguous concerns. At their most manifest
level, the results demonstrated how inadequately or insufficiently legal
tribunals rely on the empirical research for judicial guidance when
endorsing automatic juvenile transfer. First, courts excessively focus on the
serious nature of the offense, an analysis in which public safety, deterrence,
and retribution mostly override an evaluation of a juvenile's competency-
related abilities.174  Second, courts routinely neglect to consider how
psychosocial immaturity factors are, to a certain extent, the cause of violent
juvenile crime2 75 and, correspondingly, how such causes affect the
juvenile's legal decision-making abilities.276 Third, courts generally fail to
274 See KUPCHIK, supra note 24, at 19; Brink, supra note 30; Feld, Juvenile Transfer,
supra note 24, at 601; Feld, Changing Jurisprudence of Waiver, supra note 24, at 13-14;
Kurlychek & Johnson, supra note 25; Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 57, at 380; Steiner
& Wright, supra note 49; Steiner et al., supra note 25.
275 CORRIERO, supra note 37; Feld, Juvenile Transfer, supra note 24, at 603.
276 See Grisso et al., supra note 22, at 335-36; Katner, supra note 41; Scott & Grisso,
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recognize the significant impact developmental immaturity has on the
defendant's adjudicative competence, 277 as well as the psychosocial factors
that greatly impair an adolescent's decisional competence when transferred
to an adult criminal proceeding. 27 8 Fourth, courts typically emphasize a get-
tough-on-juvenile-crime perspective, thereby readying the youth to become
a hardened career criminal,279 eroding prospects for rehabilitative
treatment 28° and undermining the possibility of successful community
reentry.281
Collectively, then, the approach adopted by the courts, as repeatedly
borne out in this qualitative endeavor, satisfies the needs of an organized
society. However, it does little to address the replicated empirical problems
raised when waiving adolescents to the adult system. These problems arise
from "the belief that serious crimes committed by young offenders may
reflect developmental deficiencies in autonomy and social judgment, [that if
treated could lead to] ... a reduction in their culpability., 28 2 Accordingly,
if society is to create meaningful change in the character of persistent
youthful offending, then it must reconsider what is for "the greater good."
This deeper level of investigation entails a re-assessment of the moral
philosophy through which the court's logic could be communicated,
mindful of the more current trends in the law-psychology-justice sub-field,
and as developed in psychological jurisprudence.
A. ADOLESCENT TRANSFER: A PRELIMINARY LAW-PSYCHOLOGY-
JUSTICE PERSPECTIVE
The current legal theory informing automatic juvenile transfer cases is
dominated by the philosophy of consequentialism and, to a lesser extent,
deontology. These forms of legal ethics perceive the function of law as a
guarantor of personal safety and property, as well as a securer against the
invasion of or harm to the moral rights of others.28 3  However,
consequentialist and formalist approaches do not recognize that the "proper
supra note 26; Steinberg, supra note 21.
277 See Oberlander et al., supra note 38, at 548; Scott & Grisso, supra note 26; Viljoen &
Grisso, supra note 26.
278 See Bonnie, supra note 80; Grisso et al., supra note 22; Katner, supra note 41; Scott
& Grisso, supra note 26; Steinberg, supra note 21.
279 Bishop & Frazier, supra note 35, at 257; Rossiter, supra note 29, at 130.
280 KUPCHIK, supra note 24, at 152; Rossiter, supra note 29.
281 CORRIERO, supra note 37, at 49; Bishop & Frazier, supra note 35, at 260.
282 KUPCHIK, supra note 24, at 82.
283 Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Sclum, An Introduction to Aretaic Theories of Law, in
VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 2 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008).
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end of law is the promotion of human flourishing., 284  This philosophy
constitutes the foundation of Aristotelian virtue ethics. 2 5  As such, if
judicial decision-making is to resemble this brand of moral philosophy, then
outcomes must be sought that enable all people to excel.286 If the prevailing
science repeatedly indicates that transferred juveniles who receive adult
sanctions undergo grave harm throughout the course of their incarceration
and recidivate more violently upon release, then the judicial actions taken
against youthful offenders does nothing to encourage them to live morally.
Moreover, and consistent with virtue jurisprudence, a judge who acts as a
"fully virtuous agent.., is not disposed [or required] to act in accord with
social norms that would undermine human flourishing. '" 287 Regrettably, the
punitive path endorsed by the courts does little to nurture or grow such
potential excellence. As such, an alternative jurisprudence is sorely needed;
one that is consistent with a virtue-based philosophy and one that moves
past the harm and ineffectiveness perpetuated by consequentialist and
formalist thinking.
Ethical inquiry is an undertaking that is prescriptive more so than
descriptive.288 Explained differently, the study of ethics does not merely
cease when the moral beliefs, principles, and goals of the subject (for
example, adolescent waiver, developmental maturity, and trial fitness) are
evaluated; instead, it endeavors to establish what ought to be in light of
what is.289  Consistent with psychological jurisprudence, then, what is
fundamentally at issue is whether something more, or something better, can
(and should) be done for all parties in dispute, such that assumed theory is
translated into worthwhile public policy. Therapeutic jurisprudence,
284 Id.
285 Aristotle recognized the immature rationality of youths and regarded it as natural. He
referred to adolescents as "prone to desires and inclined to do whatever they desire ...
unable to resist their impulses." ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE
149 (George A. Kennedy trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2007). He noted that youths resort to
impulses because they have not yet experienced much failure. Aristotle suggested that
adolescents were "inexperienced with constraints" because they had only been "educated by
conventions," lacking an understanding in the complexities of life. Id. at 150. He argued
that youths act out of an excess of emotion because they are convinced that they know
everything worth knowing and are passionate in their stubbornness. Id. For this reason,
Aristotle maintained that adolescents commit wrongs out of insolence rather than malice. Id.
Thus, he argued that youths who committed crimes warranted pity for their emotional
immaturity; they still possessed innocence, yet were often placed in the realm of adult
matters. Id. at 150-51.
286 VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 283.
287 Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice: An Aretaic Account of the Virtue of Lawfulness,
in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 283, at 167.




restorative justice, and commonsense justice are three distinct practices that
endeavor to grow the law-psychology-justice agenda, consistent with the
aims of psychological jurisprudence and the moral philosophy of virtue
ethics. In what follows, the application of their respective key principles to
the problem of juvenile transfer is speculatively enumerated. The goal here
is to provisionally outline the ethical direction in which court decision-
making could move for the benefit of offending youths, their victims, and
the communities to which both are intimately connected, in order to grow
human excellence for all.
Winick and Wexler maintain that if lawyers and judges are to practice
therapeutic jurisprudence in which less harmful outcomes for crime are
sought, then they must employ an ethic of care. zg° Care ethics utilizes
virtues such as compassion, tolerance, relationship, and benevolence when
assessing the contextual and situational factors of conflict.291 This approach
promotes effective resolution rather than scrutinizing essential legal facts.292
Thus, the role of the legal professional entails "sensitive counseling.,
293
This is a jurisprudence in which the client's psychological well-being is
valued by the judge-as-counselor, 294 a decision-maker whose honed
interpersonal skills follow from a revamped approach to clinical legal
education.
In the instance of juvenile transfer where the adolescent possesses
psycho-legal deficits due to developmental immaturity, such a practice
could be quite beneficial, especially if the courtroom workgroup was
sensitive to the adolescent's limited trial fitness. However, to retool the
way practicing lawyers and judges approach juvenile transgressors will
require a "reconceptualization" of skills training for these professionals.295
In other words, and especially in the case of youthful offenders, additional
consideration would need to be given to the defendant's cognitive deficits
and emotional well-being instead of merely attending to their legal rights.296
Thus, education is pivotal to the application of therapeutic jurisprudence
and to the anti-therapeutic response the criminal justice system engenders
290 Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law
School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV.
605, 605-06 (2006).
291 See Elizabeth Bernstein & Carol Gilligan, Unfairness and Not Listening: Converging
Themes in Emma Willard Girls' Development, in MAKING CONNECTIONS: THE RELATIONAL
WORLDS OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS AT EMMA WILLARD SCHOOL 147, 155 (Carol Gilligan et al.
eds., 1989).
292 WILLIAMS & ARRIGO, supra note 17, at 263-65.
293 Winick & Wexler, supra note 290, at 605.
294 See generally LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 9.
295 Winick & Wexler, supra note 290, at 606.
296 See id. at 606-07.
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towards waived adolescents. Indeed, re-educating legal professionals-
including judges-in the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence helps make
the case that decision brokers can identify alternatives to harsh
punishments, including transfer, for juvenile offenders, particularly since
the punitive response often leads to recidivism in most cases.2 97
Consequently, the lawyer and judge would need to learn the importance of
resolutions that endeavor to heal the character flaws of wayward youth.
This strategy would attempt "to keep the client out of trouble, to reduce
conflict, and to increase the client's life opportunities, '298 built on an ethic
of care. If successfully undertaken, such an approach could foster a
reduction in recidivism benefiting both potential victims and society more
generally.
Rather than focusing on punishing the offender, restorative justice
emphasizes repairing the relationship between the victim and transgressor
while seeking to "maintain[] order and social and moral balance in the
community., 299 This is because the "nature of crime" is not perceived "as
an offense against the ... state [or] . . . as deviant behavior that needs to be
suppressed, punished, or treated" through the formal court system.
300
Rather, and especially in the instance of youth justice reform, decision-
making is best addressed vis-A-vis a "community conference model.,
30 1
Restorative justice recognizes that when a harm or injury occurs, the
manner by which the criminal justice system responds can potentially cause
the community, the victim, and the offender to feel "alienated, more
damaged, disrespected, disempowered,. . . less safe and less cooperative
with society., 30 2 In the context of youthful transgressors, this outcome can
and does lead to recidivism. 30 3 The restorative justice approach seeks to
prevent this potential danger through discussion, dialogue, and negotiation
297 James McGuire, Can the Criminal Law Ever Be Therapeutic?, 18 BEHAV. Scl. & L.
413 (2000).
298 Winick & Wexler, supra note 290, at 609.
299 MICHAEL BRASWELL ET AL., CORRECTIONS, PEACEMAKING, AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE:
TRANSFORMING INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 141 (2001); see also NESS & STRONG, supra
note 13; SULLIVAN & TIFFT, supra note 14.
300 Paul McCold, Paradigm Muddle: The Threat to Restorative Justice Posed by Its
Merger with Community Justice, 7 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 13, 14 (2004).
301 Jim Dignan & Peter Marsh, Restorative Justice and Family Group Conferences in
England: Current State and Future Prospects, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES 85
(Allison Morris & Gabrielle Maxwell eds., 2001).
302 BRASWELL ET AL., supra note 299, at 142; see also Christopher R. Williams, Toward
a Transvaluation of Criminal 'Justice:' On Vengeance, Peacemaking, and Punishment, 26
HUMAN. & SOC'Y 100 (2002).
303 Laura S. Abrams et al., Young Offenders Speak About Meeting Their Victims:
Implications for Future Programs, 9 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 243, 244 (2006).
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among those involved in and affected by a crime.30 4 The ensuing
conversation among offender, victim, mediator, and the broader community
strives to construct an effective and pro-social course of reparative action
for the juvenile.30 5 Additionally, the objective is to heal the harm done to
the victim and to society. 30 6  Along these lines, the community might
undertake action to correct the underlying causes of the criminality.
30 7
These reparative efforts could be social, economic, or environmental in
nature.308
Interestingly, a courtroom workgroup, educated in the principles of
therapeutic jurisprudence, might perceive the benefits of a restorative
justice program and seek it out as a venue better suited to address the needs
of youthful offenders, as well as those injured and the community in which
such transgressors and victims reside.30 9 As an integrative expression of
psychological jurisprudence, such an approach would endeavor to specify
where and how community justice might be embodied for all parties in
dispute. 310 This proposed conceptual synthesis would strategically promote
"improving the quality of community life and the capacity of local
communities to prevent [adolescent] crime and to effectively respond to
criminal incidents when they occur . .. ,,311 As a tangible expression of
virtue ethics, the integration of therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative
justice would acknowledge that juvenile transgression "is caused by young
people growing up in... dysfunctional areas with high neighborhood
disorder, poor public services, high fear of crime, and poor quality of
life. 312 Moreover, as a practical basis to advance policy and to honor and
affirm the dignity and needs of offenders, victims, and the neighborhood in
which both live, an ethic of care would underscore the jurisprudential
decision-making analysis.31 3
304 David R. Karp et al., Reluctant Participants in Restorative Justice? Youthful
Offenders and Their Parents, 7 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 199, 199-200 (2004); see also
Christopher R. Williams, Compassion, Suffering and the Self. A Moral Psychology of Social
Justice, 56 CURRENT Soc. 5 (2008).
305 Dignan & Marsh, supra note 301.
306 Karp et al., supra note 304, at 199-200.
307 See, e.g., VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 13.
308 SULLIVAN & TIFFT, supra note 14.
309 John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM. L.
BULL. 244 (2002).
310 McCold, supra note 300.
311 David R. Karp & Todd Clear, The Community Justice Frontier: An Introduction to
WHAT IS COMMUNITY JUSTICE? ix (David R. Karp & Todd R. Clear eds., 2002).
312 McCold, supra note 300, at 16.
313 Williams, supra note 302.
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Finkel's approach to commonsense justice is not limited to promoting
a more informed opinion of practical judgment from the jury box alone;
rather, re-engaging the conscience of the community in justice matters also
is pursued.31 4 An important aspect of restorative justice is to bring the
neighborhood back into the conflict resolution process. 31 5 Thus, restorative
justice is a practice that engages the public so that citizens can take a more
active role in a process that seeks a remedial response to juvenile offending
while also being cognizant of those concerns emanating from the
community at large. Indeed, the mediation process is the setting in which
all citizens in disagreement-for example, victim, offender, family
members, and civic leaders-work to establish a fair and just resolution
guided by the logic of determining the best course of action with minimal
harm. Here, too, commonsense justice is consistent with virtue ethics in
that ordinary people are encouraged to articulate their felt regard for such
notions as fairness, equity, and honor-in short, morality.
316
In this respect, then, a very important dimension of restoring justice is
to engage the adolescent offender and the victim in a form of "empathetic
association., 31 7  While forms of restorative justice mediation assume
several approaches (for example, victim-offender reconciliation programs,
family group conferencing, victim-offender panels), 31 8 they all place the
transgressor and the injured party as well as other concerned citizens in a
setting where varying points of view regarding pain and harm, remorse and
repentance, and healing and forgiveness are voiced. 319 Following the logic
of psychological jurisprudence in which the moral philosophy of virtue
ethics underscores the judicial analysis, legal tribunals would do well to
assess whether and to what extent reliance on such restorative programming
as a dimension of their courtroom decision-making would yield reparative
outcomes beneficial to all parties in dispute.
When judicial decision-making on the issue of youthful offending is
guided by an ethic of care and sensitive counseling (therapeutic
jurisprudence), relationship building in which injury is owned and healing
314 FINKEL, supra note 5.
315 SULLIVAN & TIFFT, supra note 14.
316 Norman J. Finkel et al., Commonsense Morality Across Cultures: Notions of
Fairness, Justice, Honor, and Equity, 3 DISCOURSE STUD. 5 (2001).
317 CORRIERO, supra note 37, at 87-88.
318 VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 13; SULLIVAN & TIFFT, supra note 14.
319 See, e.g., Abrams et al., supra note 303; Bruce A. Arrigo & Robert C. Schehr,
Restoring Justice for Juveniles: A Critical Analysis of Victim-Offender Mediation, 15 JUST.
Q. 629 (1998); Edmund F. McGarrell & Natalie K. Hipple, Family Group Conferencing and
Re-Offending Among First-Time Juvenile Offenders: The Indianapolis Experiment, 24 JUST.
Q. 221, 222-23 (2007); Williams, supra note 304.
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promoted (restorative justice), and community conscience in which
everyday citizens discuss fairness and morality (commonsense justice), then
the resolutions sought entail integrity-based dialogical exchange. Most
specifically, these are exchanges in which the wayward youth and the
aggrieved party convene in a non-adversarial setting whereby a mediator
facilitates the conversation so that "resolving" the pain caused by the
conflict can commence. 320 Moreover, when judges face decision-making in
which juvenile crime is at issue, empathic insight underscoring the
jurisprudential reasoning necessitates that considerations of character also
inform the mediated discussion. These are discussions among those in
dispute where the adolescent is encouraged to assess how his or her
criminal actions were morally flawed and why adopting pro-social behavior
would benefit the individual and society. Along these lines, Braithwaite
explained the powerful impact that "shaming" rather than punishment can
have on an offender's character. As he observed:
Shaming is more pregnant with symbolic content than punishment. Punishment is
a denial of confidence in the morality of the offender by reducing norm compliance to
a crude cost-benefit calculation; shaming can be a reaffirmation of the morality of the
offender by expressing personal disappointment that the offender should do something
so out of character, and, if shaming is reintegrative, by expressing personal
satisfaction in seeing the character of the offender restored. Punishment erects
barriers between the offender and punisher through transforming the relationship into
one of power assertion and injury; shaming produces a greater interconnectedness
between the parties, albeit a painful one, and interconnectedness which can produce
the repulsion of stigmatization or the establishment of a potentially more positive
relationship following reintegration. Punishment is often shameful and shaming
usually punishes. But whereas punishment gets its symbolic content only from its
denunciatory association with shaming, shaming is pure symbolic content.
32
The theory and practice of reintegrative shaming fosters "earned
redemption" for the offender and it has demonstrated success in empirical
research.322 When fitted to the mediation process, the dialogical exchange
becomes more therapeutic in design in that it enhances a sense of
community, promotes participation, and aims to empower all parties
323
involved in healing the injury caused by (adolescent) crime.
Additionally, psychosocial factors such as peer pressure, risk taking, and
blunted autonomy-so prominent among developmentally immature
youths-can be explored while seeking a reparative solution. Thus, when
recognized as a dimension of virtue ethics, as well as an expression of how
psychological jurisprudence translates evolving theory into worthwhile
320 Arrigo & Schehr, supra note 319.
321 JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION 72-73 (1989).
322 McGarrell & Hipple, supra note 319, at 241.
323 Levine, supra note 15.
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public policy, the judge's decision-making in support of mediation becomes
as fully informed as it does potentially enlightened. Arguably, the benefits
of such an approach inure to the adolescent offender, the aggrieved victim,
and the community that inexorably binds both together.
As a matter of establishing cogent law and policy, the reality of
automatic adolescent transfer in which cognitive and emotional deficits are
featured raises significant questions about the youth's trial fitness, as well
as the adolescent's amenability to processing, treatment, and successful
community reentry. These empirical concerns notwithstanding, the
prevailing case law on the subject as articulated in state supreme court and
appellate court decisions repeatedly overlooks or ignores this scientific
evidence when rendering judicial opinions.
As this interpretive study documents, the jurisprudential intent that
forms the basis for the court's decision-making ethically conveys its
meaning in the form of utilitarian reasoning wherein the "greater good"
amounts to protecting the public against persistent wayward adolescents.
However, as tentatively reviewed in this Part, more can be and, thus, should
be done to address the interests of society (including the victim) and,
correspondingly, the needs of delinquent or troubled youth. A law-
psychology-justice approach, steeped in the logic of psychological
jurisprudence, suggests that this direction already exists in practice in
several very noteworthy respects. Therapeutic jurisprudence, commonsense
justice, and restorative justice are three distinct, though related, strategies
whose conceptual underpinnings advance the moral philosophy of virtue
ethics. This moral philosophy endeavors to grow, deepen, and transform
the character of all people. Accordingly, legal tribunals are encouraged to
appropriate the principles of each when rendering their judicial opinions.
This undertaking may very well represent a necessary basis by which the
flourishing of developmentally immature juveniles, injured victims, and the
community to which both are intimately connected is more fully and
responsively achieved. Indeed, this recommended direction helps to make




Level I Analysis: Underlying Jurisprudential Intent
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"treat children who commit
serious crimes as adults in
order to protect society
goals"
"no absolute right requiring
children to be treated in a
special system"
"not required to give equal





"balancing test by which
public protection and
societal security are weighed
against... rehabilitation"
"best interests of the juvenile
and security of the
public ... without question
[weigh] in favor of' the
court retaining jurisdiction
"protection of society
required prosecution in the
criminal division of circuit
court"
"the concept of deterrence
and the need to balance
individual justice with the
needs of society ... also
have a place in the juvenile
justice system"
"balancing test"



















offenders than that provided
by [the juvenile] system"
"interest in crime deterrence
and public safety"
488 BRIAN G. SELLERS & BRUCE A. ARRIGO [Vol. 99
